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INTERVENTION BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD:
A REAPPRAISAL OF THE STATE'S ROLE IN
CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE CASES
JuDrr AEEN°
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE CURRENT PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW
This year in the United States more than 140,000 children will be
brought into court on the ground that they are being neglected or
abused by their parents.' Once a court agrees that it has sufficient
cause to assume jurisdiction in order' to protect a child, there is a
high probability that the child will be separated from his family for
months or years,2 or permanently.3  In addition, the parents may find
*Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Juvenile Justice Clinic, George-
town University. A.B., Cornell University; LL.B., Yale University.
The author's special thanks go to Chester Antieau, Benjamin Heineman, Wallace
Mlyniec, Robert Pozen, Martin Rein, Sherill Rudy, and John Simon for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. Catherine Branch, Steven Caffisch, Judith
Larsen, and Mary Mitchelson provided invaluable research assistance.
1. The 1975 figure is projected from statistics of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. The last year for which official figures are available is 1972,
when 141,000 neglect cases were brought to court. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION AND WELFARE, JUVENILE COaRT STATISTICS 14, table 11 (1972) (table for 1972).
The actual incidence of child abuse and neglect appears to be much higher.
In a recent evaluation of data, Richard Light estimated that each year between
665,000 and 1,675,000 children in the United States suffer abuse, sexual molestation,
or serious neglect. Light, Abused and Neglected Children in America: A Study of
Alternative Policies, 43 HARv. EDUC. REV. 556, 567 (1973).
2. A 1974 study revealed that out of a random sample of 100 child abuse or
neglect complaints received by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in
1973, 89 complaints were followed by petitions for court action. In 82 of the 89
cases, the children were removed from their homes for the period of time prior to
court hearing. M. BURT, THE SYSTEM FOR NEGLECTED AND ABUSED CHILDREN IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 10 (1974). In Los Angeles in 1972, removal was or-
dered in 62 percent of the 1,656 cases in which jurisdiction was assumed. Mnookin,
Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest, 43 HArv. EDuc. REv. 599, 606 (1973). A study
of neglect proceedings from 1968 to 1969 in the state of New York found that over
51 percent resulted in the child's placement away from home or in protective super-
vision of the family. Note, An Appraisal of New York's Statutory Response to the
Problem of Child Abuse, 7 CoLum. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 51, 72 table I (1971).
A 1965 study in Pennsylvania found that over half the children receiving services
from child welfare agencies still were being removed from their parents despite the
alleged availability of in home services. OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, PA.
DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, PENNSYLVANIA FACT Booic ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH
(1965), cited in Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystification of the Child Protection
System, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 20 n.102 (1973).
3. See notes 211-17 infra and accompanying. text (discussion of termination of
parental rights).
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themselves subjected to criminal prosecution 4 or at least to a succes-
sion of police investigators, social work investigators, social case work-
ers, mental health professionals, and court hearings. Despite the
disruptive impact this process obviously can have on children and their
families, at present there is little consensus about when a court should
find that a particular child is neglected or abused. Parents convicted
of neglect in one community might never have been brought to court
in another.' Perhaps the most prevalent characteristic of families
charged with neglect is poverty; this raises the troubling possibility
that class or cultural bias plays a significant role in decisions to label
4. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1105 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1303 (1958).
One study reported that in Massachusetts some court clerks require that a criminal
charge be ified before they will accept a civil neglect petition. Note, The Neglected
Child: His and His Family's Treatment Under Massachusetts Law and Practice and
Their Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 4 SuFFOLK L. lREv. 631, 650 (1970).
5. One sign of the lack of consensus is the broad range of present statutory
standards establishing what constitutes neglect. See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1958);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (1971); Am. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (Supp. 1972); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 45-203 (Supp. 1973); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600 (West 1972);
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(19) (Pern. Supp. 1967); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
53 (Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (1953); id. (Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-2301(9) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE: ANN.
§ 24A-401(h) (Supp. 1973); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 571-11 (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE§§ 16-1625-1626 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-4-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972);
IND. CODE § 31-5-7-6 (1969); IOwA CODE §§ 232.2(14), (15) (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-802 (1973); KY. R1EV. STAT. § 199.011 (Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.1569
(16) (Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3792 (Supp. 1974); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROCEEDINGS §§ 3-801(1), (u) (Supp. 1974); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 24
(Supp. 1974); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 712A.2(b) (1968); MINN. STAT. § 260.015,
subd. 10 (Supp. 1974); id. subd. 6 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-5(h), (i); id.
§ 93-15-7 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 211.031(1),-241,-441(1)(2) (1962); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(2) (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-201(2), (3)
(1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040(1)(a) (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:2(I)
(1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-1, 9:2-9 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-3L (Supp.
1973); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 1012(e), (f) (MeKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7A-278(3), (4) (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(5) (1974); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01.1 (Page Supp. 1974); id. §§ 5103.16, 17 (Page 1970);
OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(d) (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 419.476
(1)(d), (e), 419.523 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102 (4) (Supp. 1974); R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-3H (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 71-251 (1962); id.
§ 15-1095.9(1) (Supp. 1973); S.D. COmPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-6 (Supp. 1974);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-202(6), (7) (Supp. 1974); TE:. FAMILY CODE §§ 17.01, .04
(1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-64(17), (18) (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 632(12) (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158 (1) (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 13.04.010 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-3 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 48.13 (1957); id. (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.2(0) (Supp. 1973).
6. See generally H. MAAS & R. ENCLER, CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS (1959).
The survey of neglect practices in nine communities ranging in size and composition
from rural areas to urban centers showed less variation in practice than the authors'
knowledge of the statutory differences had led them to expect. They concluded, "it
was more the way in which a judge perceived his role, and the way in which he was
perceived in his role by others in the community that determined legal practices in
child welfare." Id. at 310.
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children neglected or abused, because it is clear that child abuse
occurs in families of all income levels.
Just as there is little agreement on when intervention in a particular
family is justified, there is little agreement about what forms of inter-
vention are constructive. The predominant approach is to separate
parent and child.8 While separation may protect a child from being
beaten by his family, the separation itself may seriously damage the
child's emotional health, particularly if the child is shifted from one
temporary home to another during the separation.
7. See D. GI., VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN THE
UNITED STATES 112 table 22 (1970). Proportionately more of the reported incidents,
however, involve low income families. A 1967 survey indicated that while nearly
65 percent of reported incidents involved families having incomes under $6,999, such
families represented less than 42 percent of the total population. Id. The dispropor-
tionate representation of poor families also appears in statistics reporting court find-
ings of neglect. A 1964 study in Minnesota found that whereas only 3 percent of
the families in the general population were receiving public assistance, 42 percent of
the families reported to be neglecting their children were receiving such assistance.
Boehm, The Community and the Social Agency Define Neglect, in 1964 CHILD WE.-
FARE 453, 459. Similar findings were reported in a 1966 study in New York City.
Forty-five percent of the households whose children were placed in foster care were
supported primarily by public assistance at the time of placement, while only 7.9
percent of the general population received such assistance. See S. JENKINS & E.
NORMrAN, FILIAL DEPRIVATION AND FOSTER CARE 25 (1972). Repeated confirmation
of such statistics has prompted one child welfare expert to conclude:
[O]rganized programs for children turn out, when examined, to be pro-
grams for the poor, for blacks, and for the otherwise disadvantaged.
There is no harm in that alone, but the programs are poor. Foster fami-
lies and institutions are a dead end for children who use them for more
than a few months-and perhaps half the children do.
Schorr, Poor Care for Poor Children-What Way Out, in CHILDREN AND DECENT
PEOPLE (1974).
8. On March 31, 1971, some 266,070 children in the United States were living
in foster family homes or group homes, while another 93,826 were in institutions.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CHILDREN SERVED BY PUBLIC
WELFARE AGENCIES AND VOLUNTARY CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS,
table 9 (NCSS Report E-9, April 27, 1973).
9. See J. CoLDsTE N, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 31-35 (1973). The authors provide a thoughtful discussion of a child's
need for continuity of relationships and describe the consequences of disruptions of
continuity, which vary with the ages of the children. The authors observe:
In infancy, from birth to approximately 18 months, any change in
routine leads to food refusals, digestive upsets, sleeping difficulties, and
crying . . . . [M~oves from the familiar to the unfamiliar cause dis-
comfort, distress, and delays in the infant's orientation and adaptation
within his surroundings. -
Change in the caretaking person for infants and toddlers further affects
the course of their emotional development . . . . When infants and
young children find themselves abandoned by the parent, they not only
suffer separation distress and anxiety, but also setbacks in the quality of
their next attachments, which will be less trustful. Where continuity of
such relationships is interrupted more than once, as happens due to
multiple placements in early years, the children's emotional attachments
become increasingly shallow and indiscriminate ....
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Unfortunately, legal commentary has not emphasized the issues of
when or how the state ought to intervene to protect children from
their parents.'0 Most recent articles have concentrated instead on
secondary issues such as how to increase the scope or frequency of
reporting to public agencies incidents of suspected child abuse or
neglect." Although better reporting may increase public awareness
of the present system and spur public pressure for reform of neglect
practice, bringing more families into court before the evidence dem-
onstrates that society can help neglected or abused children or their
families may increase the harm being done.
B. ANALYSIS OF CONPETING INTERESTS
Three primary interests must be addressed in any neglect proceed-
ing: those of the family, those of the child, and those of the state.'2
The first, the interests of the family, best can be analyzed if broken
down further into the separate interests of each parent, 3 of siblings,
For school-age children, the breaks in their relationships with their
psychological parents affect above all those achievements which are
based on identification with the parents' demand, prohibitions, and so-
cial ideals . . . . [W]here children are made to wander from one
environment to another, they may cease to identify with any set of sub-
stitute parents .... [Miultiple placement at these ages puts many
children beyond the reach of educational influence, and becomes the
direct cause of behavior which the schools experience as disrupting and
the courts label as dissocial, delinquent, or even criminal.
Id. at 32-34. See also Mahler, Symbiosis and Individuation, 29 PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDy OF aH CHILD 89 (1974). But see M. RuTrrE, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION Rr-
ASSEssED (1972) (review of the existing social science literature on separation).
Rutter points out that "problems arise in the analysis of the effects of very long-term
separations which may . . .occur for a diversity of reasons. Thus, there is a very
extensive literature showing an association between 'broken homes' and delinquency
... .However, in some cases the breakup of the home is no more than a minor
episode in a long history of family discord and disruption." Id. at 63.
10. Probably the best recent studies are those by Gil, Sullivan, and Thomas. See Gil,
The Legal Nature of Neglect, 6 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N J. 1 (1960); Sullivan,
Child Neglect: The Environmental Aspects, 29 011o ST. L.J. 85 (1968); Thomas, Child
Abuse and Neglect, Part I: Historical Overviews, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives,
50 N.C.L. REv. 293 (1972). See also Note, supra note 2; Note, supra note 4.
Two excellent recent pieces do not focus exclusively on neglect proceedings but
are nonetheless very useful. See Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their
Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 1259 (1971); Mnookin,
supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., Daly, Wilful Child Abuse and State Reporting Statutes, 23 MIAMI
L. REv. 283 (1969); Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLum. L.
REv. 679 (1966); Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAf.
L.Q. 245 (1974).
12. If the child has been abandoned, the parental interests are insubstantial, but
difficult procedural issues may remain, particularly since the doctrine of Stanley v.
Illinois may have created rights for biological fathers. See 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
13. The term parent should be understood to extend to a de facto parent, a care-
taker who has acted as a substitute parent or guardian of the child for an extended
period of time. Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FnxuD, & A. SOLNIT, supra note 9, at 98 (con-
cept of psychological parent).
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and of the extended family. Our legal system for the most part has
acknowledged only the interests of the parents and has considered
only sporadically the interests of siblings or other relatives outside the
nuclear family.14 Moreover, most courts have operated on the ques-
tionable assumption that the interests of the two parents are not in
conflict. 5 The one major exception, child custody cases, dramatically
reveals the general inability of the legal system to pierce successfully
the veil of the harmonious family unit. 6
The law quite clearly addresses the interests of the parents: parents
in England and the United States traditionally have been vested with
the authority to raise their own children without state intervention.
Social historians have chronicled inroads on the traditional powers of
the family resulting from changes in the economic structure and the
gradual assumption of traditional family activities by other institutions
such as schools or hospitals.'7 Similarly, case law reflects some inroads
which have been made on the traditionally sacrosanct power of the
parent.' 8 Nonetheless, the overwhelming weight of legal authority
14. Compare Orr v. State, 123 N.E. 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 1919) (child abandoned
by parents but taken into grandparents' home and treated with great affection is not
a neglected child) and In re Sneed, 230 Ore. 13, 368 P.2d 334 (1962) (although
mother afforded no care, child who was in actual though not legal custody of grand-
mother could not be declared neglected absent showing that grandmother's care was
inadequate) with Bee v. Robbins, 303 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) (child
whose mother was dead and whose father was serving 50 year prison sentence was
neglected even though child was cared for by maternal grandparents); cf. In re Frances,
49 Misc. 2d 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. City 1966) (battered child who
had been living with mother and stepfather discharged to maternal grandmother with
visitation by mother only in home of grandmother).
15. If, for example, a father is a chronic child beater but the mother is a model
caretaker, the dilemma to be resolved is whether the court should declare the child
abused and remove him from home, or should allow the mother to keep the child on
the condition that she separate from her spouse. Most courts have not considered these
issues. Cf. In re Halamuda, 85 Cal. App. 2d 219, 192 P.2d 781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948)
(mother's failure to protect child from father's extreme cruelty is mental cruelty on
her part).
16. See J. GoLDsTmN & J. KAz, THE FAwm.Y AND THE LAw 176-216 (1965).
The authors describe a six year battle between the parents over custody of three
children. The costs of the battle included legal fees in excess of $45,000, court ex-
penses of between $10,000 and $15,000, and immeasurable emotional damage to the
parents and the children. Id. at 562.
17. See T. PAnSONS & R. BALES, FAmxy, SocrAr.iT AoN AND INTERACTnON PRO-
css (1955); THE NUcLEAR FAmLY IN CRisis: THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATivE
(M. Cordon, ed. 1972); Hearings on American Families: Trends and Pressures 1973,
Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 134-80 (1973).
18. See State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901) (right of state to prosecute
parents who did not send their children to school confirmed); cf. Stuart v. School
Dist. No. 1, 30 Mich. 69 (1874) (legislation taxing public to pay for schooling up-
held). But cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1935) ("fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only"). Recently, the Supreme Court agreed to exempt Amish
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continues to support the rights of parents to control the upbringing
of their children.'9 This right has even achieved constitutional status.
20
The interests of children, unlike those of parents, generally have
not been recognized as legal rights. For example, children have no
legal right to medical care or to a nutritionally adequate diet.21 The
neglect process has provided virtually the only legal redress for chil-
dren who lack such necessities. Unfortunately, the process is an in-
direct solution which normally results in the placement of a needy
child in the custody of a new caretaker rather than in the establishment
of minimum standards of medical care or nutrition or in the provision
of goods or services directly to the child.
The lack of consensus about the basic rights of children provides
one of the main bases for the disagreement over the standards for
neglect findings. It is unlikely that standards detailing the conditions
believed to be necessary to the growth and development of children
into mature human beings, both physically and emotionally, will soon
children from the compulsory school laws after the eighth grade, but the Court seemed
motivated more by the productive and law-abiding nature of the Amish community
than by concern for general parental rights. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222
(1972).
19. See Vaughn v. Vaughn, - Ind. -, - N.E.2d -, 43 U.S.L.W. 2163 (Ct. App.
Oct. 22, 1974), quoting Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924). In
Smith the court had reasoned that "[f]rom our knowledge of the social life of today,
and the tendencies of the unrestrained youth of this generation, there appears to be
much reason for the continuation of parental control during the child's minority, and
that such control should not be embarrassed by conferring upon the child a right of
civil redress .... ." 81 Ind. App. at 569, 142 N.E. at 129. Cf. Glaser v. Marietta,
351 F. Supp. 555, 560-61 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (school district regulation authorizing
corporal punishment usurps parental right to control method of raising children and
cannot be enforced if child s parents notify school officials that such discipline is
prohibited).
20. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1933) (although state rearing of
all children has "been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touch-
ing the relation between individual and State were wholly diffrent from those upon
which our institutions rest; and it will hardly be affirmed that any legislature could
impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to both
letter and spirit of the Constitution."); of. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972) ("primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now estab-
lished beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"); May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (right of custody considered more important than property
rights).
21. No implication that adults have a legal right to medical care or to a nutri-
tionally adequate diet is intended. However, adults do have rights not accorded minors
that permit them to acquire goods and services. Adults are not prohibited from work-
ing and have the right to travel, to marry, to obtain medical treatment without the
consent of a parent or guardian, and to sue for loss of services when their children
are injured. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1968) (waiting period
for welfare migrants violates right to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1966) (marriage is an essential personal right); W. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF PERsoNs AND DoMmsTic RELATIONS § 131 (1896) (parents have right to sue
for loss of child's services).
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be established or recognized as legal rights.2 Indeed, the imposition
of such conditions as a matter of law in most instances would result in
an unacceptable degree of state intrusion into family life.
The law, however, has sanctioned some degree of state intervention
into family life; over the centuries a general guide for intervention
has developed in the extensive body of case law interpreting the state's
parens patriae power." The state acts as the primary protector of
children from abuse or neglect. It may at first seem strange, therefore,
to separate the interests of the child from those of the state. But the
state has interests other than those inherent in its parens patriae role,
and these other interests may conflict with those of the child in a
particular case.24 For example, the state has a strong interest in main-
taining family autonomy.25 The state's desire to maintain family
autonomy is not only a matter of tradition, but also reflects a recogni-
tion of the family's effectiveness as a social institution; no one has
devised a better system for overseeing the rearing of most children.
Autonomous families not only provide the conditions needed for the
physical and emotional development of individual children, but also
make possible a religious and cultural diversity that might disappear
if the state extensively regulated or controlled child rearing.26 A
second interest of the state is the exercise of its police power interest.
22. The United Nations has published a Declaration of the Rights of the Child,
a declaration that perhaps most closely resembles the needed standards. G.A. Res.
1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 19, U.N. Doe. A/4249 (1959); of. Foster & Freed,
A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 347 (1972).
23. See notes 47-67 infra and accompanying text.
24. See State ex rel. Juv. Dep't of Multnomah County v. Wade, 527 P.2d 753
(Ore. Ct. App. 1974). The court in Wade commented:
Although the conflict between the interests of the state and those of the
child are not as apparent as the child-parent conflict . . . the fact that
in most cases the termination of parental rights makes the state the
recipient of the child's custody . . . thereby enabling it to consent to
an adoption . . . indicates that the potential may not be insubstantial.
When terminations are viewed as a means of facilitating adoptions, one
becomes aware that they will always promote the interests of the state
regardless of the peculiar interests of any single child; terminations aid
the state in meeting the demand for 'adoptable" children while also
relieving it from financial costs of long-term foster care, homemaker
services, and other welfare or public services.
Id. at 757.
25. As Roscoe Pound observed, "in general it remains true that the social in-
terest in the family as a social institution requires the law to proceed with great
caution in securing the interests of children against their parents." Pound, Individual
Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MicH. L. REv. 177, 186 (1916).
26. See B. RussELL, MARRIAGE AND MOaALS 171-74 (1929), reprinted in J.
COLnSTEmN & J. KIA-z, supra note 16, at 455-458. Russell commented that "the ad-
ministrator invariably likes uniformity. It is convenient for statistics and pigeon-
holing, and if it is the 'right' sort of uniformity it means the existence of large num-
bers of human beings of the sort that he considers desirable. Children handed over
to the mercy of institutions will therefore tend to be all alike, while the few who
cannot conform to the recognized pattern will suffer persecution, not only from their
fellows, but from the authorities." Id. at 458.
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Without reopening the traditional debate about whether this is pri-
marily an interest aimed at deterrence or at punishment,27 one who
analyzes the neglect process should study the police power interest
because of its potential for undermining the parens patriae role of the
state.28
At least two other key interests of the state-administrative efficiency
and fairness-may conflict with the interests of the child in neglect
proceedings. The public interest in the efficient use of public resources
may explain why the state does not pursue its parens patriae power
where intervention is not clearly preferable to nonintervention and
why it uses public resources only when the gain to the individuals
served and the long term social saving exceed the cost of intervention.
By providing counsel to both indigent parents and children in neglect
proceedings, for example, the state's public interest in fairness may
be balanced by the costs and thereby decrease its willingness to
intervene.
C. AN APPROACH TO REFORM
The analytic confusion which has resulted in part from the paucity
of legal commentary addressed to standards or dispositions in neglect
proceedings has been compounded by the lack of systematic evalua-
tion of how this public intervention has operated over the centuries.
Part two of this article, therefore, is devoted to an examination of the
historic antecedents of the present neglect process and will illuminate
the way the law has defined and protected the competing interests
of child, family, and state in each of three eras. Three specific issues
will be considered: (1) the purpose of intervention; (2) the standards
established to guide intervention decisions; and (3) the dispositions
provided for children declared "neglected." With the insight provided
by this backlog of experience, as well as by current behavioral science
studies, part three assesses the current patchwork of standards and
dispositions of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. A final
section presents specific recommendations for drafting future neglect
statutes.
II. HISTORY OF NEGLECT INTERVENTION
A. FROM TUDOR TnIMES TO THE NI1ETEENTH CENTURY
1. The Poor Law Heritage. The sixteenth century was a pe-
riod of economic transition and stress in England, during which bands
27. See generally H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPoNsmmrrY (1968); H. PAcyn,
Lmrrs OF THE CRItMINAL SANCTION (1968).
28. See Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child
Abuse, 12 AM. Car. L. REv. 103, 119-22 (1974) (discussion of drawbacks of criminal
prosecution as an approach to the problem of child abuse).
[Vol. 63:887
C1mID NEGLECT AND ABUSE8
of "sturdy beggars" began to fill the roads and to terrorize town and
country. 9 The number of poor mushroomed to the point that private
charities no longer could provide adequate relief. As a result, Parlia-
ment began to provide for the relief of the poor and their children
on a systematic basis. As early as 1535 a statute provided that "[c]hil-
dren under fourteen years of age, and above five, that live in idleness,
and be taken begging, may be put to serve by the governors or cities,
towns, etc. to husbandry, or other crafts or labors." 3 0 In 1601, the
Elizabeth Poor Law 31 consolidated similar early legislative efforts into
a single, comprehensive program of poor relief that became the model
for the next three centuries in America as well as England.2
The Elizabethan system aided the poor in several ways. It provided
for the establishment of tax-supported hospitals and poor houses, or
almshouses, to shelter the poor who were too old or too ill to work.33
The employable poor were compelled to work or sent to houses of
correction if they refused to work.34 Finally, children of the poor
were put to work or apprenticed.3 5 In each parish the system was
administered by the church warden and several substantial house-
holders, who were selected as overseers of the poor of the parish, and
who were empowered to set to work or to apprentice "the children
of all such whose parents shall not by said churchwardens and over-
seers, or the greater part of them, be thought able to keep and main-
tain their children." 36 To minimize costs, the overseers limited eligi-
bility for relief to the poor who had been born in a community or
had lived there for a long time. Thus, in addition to providing relief,
the poor laws established restrictions on rights to travel, on personal
civil rights, and particularly on parental rights.
It is impossible to determine exactly how many children were sepa-
rated from their families under this legislation; hundreds were shipped
to the American colonies beginning in 1617,38 and thousands were later
29. I. PiNCHBECK & M. HEwrIr, 1 CHMLD EN IN ENGLISH SocIETY 93 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as I. PCHBECK]. See also R. KELSO, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC POOR
RELIEF IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1620-1900, at 3-29 (1922) (description of the link between
economic conditions and the first poor relief legislation).
30. 27 Hen. 8, c. 25 (1535).
31. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1601).
32. See tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Develop-
ment and Present Status, Part 1, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 258 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as tenBroek I].
33. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, §§I, III, XII (1601).
34. id. H I, rV.
35. Id. §§ I, V. In theory, apprenticeship involved training in the master's "craft,
mystery, or occupation," while indenture was simply a work contract. In practice, both
usually involved little training. See G. ABBOTT, 1 THE CIL AND TH STATE 79-255
(1938).
36. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, §§ I, V (1601).
37. See tenBroek I, supra note 32, at 259.
38. I. Pinchbeck, supra note 29, at 105-07.
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impressed into the Merchant Marine.39  As distasteful as the cavalier
separation of children from their parents may seem today, however,
the conclusion that the statutes manifested only discriminatory atti-
tudes toward the poor would be mistaken; the apparent harshness was
more a product of cost consciousness than of discrimination. Accord-
ing to Professor tenBroek, "[o]nce the public agreed to pay the bill,
it acquired a pressing concern about the size of the bill and an active
interest in finding methods for reducing it."40 The system of "binding
out" poor children reduced the costs; the children who were bound
out could pay for part of their care through their own labor. Similarly,
the decision to separate poor children from their families and to put
them to work did not necessarily indicate class bias because in this
pre-child labor law era most children worked 41 and upper class fami-
lies of the time frequently sent adolescents to other families for train-
ing.42 Indeed, the poor laws were quite humanitarian in their attempt
to provide poor children with proper work attitudes as well as useful
skills in an age when no other public education or training was
available.43
The record of providing skills through apprenticeship, however,
apparently was poor almost from the start. "Rogues soon swarmed
again," complained Lord Coke in 1624,44 and the cause allegedly was
the failure of the overseers to apprentice children.45  The Privy Coun-
cil for a time tried to correct the enforcement problems, but the out-
break of civil war soon made them worse. By mid-century, an in-
creasingly harsh and repressive policy toward the poor emerged. Soon
work houses for children were established, in sharp contrast with the
earlier benevolent statutory scheme for training.4
2. The Growth of Parens Patriae. For children who were not
poor, the law provided little legal protection. Children had no rights
39. See id. at 108-13.
40. tenBroek I, supra note 32, at 286.
41. See 5 Eliz., c. 4 (1562) (establishing a system of apprenticeship not limited to
poor children). See generally 1 G. ABBOTT, supra note 35, at 79-90.
42. I. PINCHBECK, supra note 29, at 25-33. See also P. AniEs, C Naurusus OF
CHImDHooD 365-66 (1962); J. G~m~s, YOUTH AND HIsToRY 17 (1974). The lack of
discrimination in child rearing practice of the period does not imply that those practices
had no negative effects on adult personalities. One commentator has concluded that
"a large number of adults . . . of the gentry class in . . . the sixteenth and seventeenth
century, were emotionally stunted and found it extremely difficult to establish warm
personal relationships with other people." Laurence Stone, The Massacre of the
Innocents, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Nov. 14, 1974, at 25.
43. Cf. I. PiNCHBECK, supra note 29, at 242 (while life undoubtedly was hard for
many apprentices, many poor children received sound training, and the alternatives to
apprenticeship must have been far worse for many children).
44. See id. at 143.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 146.
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of action when physically mistreated by their parents.47 Originally
even the parental duty of support was considered to be more a moral
than a legal obligation.48  On rare occasions, equity would override
a father's right to custody, but only at the request of another relative-
usually the mother-who wanted the child or when the child had an
estate large enough to reimburse a court-appointed guardian.49
The protection equity accorded these infants apparently arose as
much from their revenue value as from concern for their well-being.
Under the feudal system of land ownership, a minor's guardian could
profit handsomely by controlling the minor's estate, by marrying the
ward to one of his own heirs, or by selling the right to marriage.50 As
early as 1503, the Crown established a Master of Wards to protect
the estates of minors and to regulate the sale of their wardships upon
the deaths of their fathers.5 In 1540, Henry VIII formalized this
state regulation by establishing the Court of Wards.52 Under this
system, guardianship of the person, like that of the estate, went to
the highest bidder and substantial revenues accrued to the crown.5"
During the seventeenth century, opposition began to mount both
to the disregard shown to the claims of mothers and to the marriages
forced on young children.54 Eventually the Court of Wards was
abolished and fathers were authorized to appoint by deed or will a
guardian of the person for children who survived them.55  In addition,
the chancellor began to protect wards from economic injury, and al-
lowed the wards to bring petitions against their guardians for an ac-
counting of the rents and profits of their land.55 Soon the chancellor
required guardians to provide their wards with suitable education. 7
47. See C. VEmu , Am cAnxc FAumy LAws § 267 (1936) (a parent not civilly
liable at common law for injury to his minor child; rule applicable even if the injury
was great or willful).
48. See W. TiFFANy, supra note 21, § 231; cf. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMrarErARMs
ON ms LAWS OF ENGLAND 446-49 (1826) (duty of parents to provide for their children
is principle of natural law). As late as 1840, English judges held that "in point of
law, a father who gives no authority enters into no contract, is no more liable for goods
supplied to his son, than a brother, or an uncle, or a mere stranger would be." Morti-
more v. Wright, 151 Eng. Rep. 502, 504 (Ex. 1840).
49. See W. TwFA'NY, supra note 21, § 247-48.
50. See I. P CHBECK, supra note 29, at 58-59. See also Rossman, Parens Patriae,
4 OnE. L. REv. 233, 236-38 (1925).
51. See I. PINCHBECK, supra note 29, at 59.
52. See Ex parte Daedler, 228 P. 467 (Cal. 1924).
53. Pinchbeck reports that during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I the sale of ward-
ships brought an average annual income of £14,677 to the crown. If the full profits had
been paid directly to the Court of Wards rather than to intermediary officials, the
Queen might have made almost £2,000,000 annually. See I. PINcHBEcK, supra note
29, at 60.
54. See id. at 72-73.
55. 12 Car. 2, c. 24, §§ I, VIII (1660).
56. See Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of the "Parens Patriae,"
22 S. CAn. L. REv. 147, 151 (1970).
57. Id. at 153.
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The concept of parens patriae reportedly was used for the first time
in 1696 in Falkland v. Bertie.5 8  Lord Somers there stated that with
the dissolution of the Court of Wards, what he termed pater patriae
responsibility of the King for the care of charities, infants, idiots, and
lunatics returned to the Chancery. 9  The parens patriae power grad-
ually was expanded to justify court interference to protect wards from
the misdeeds of testamentary guardians 60 and eventually interference
to protect a child from exploitation by third parties despite the fact
that his father was alive and able to protect his interests." But not
until 1827 did a court consider directly the scope of the court's juris-
diction to intervene between parent and child. Then, in Wellesly v.
Beaufort,62 Lord Eldon ruled that "this Court has not the means of
acting, except where it has property to act upon. It is not, however,
from any want of jurisdiction that it does not act, but from a want
of means to exercise that jurisdiction; because the Court cannot take
on itself the maintenance of all the children in the kingdom." 3 This
view of the court's power controlled until 1847 when the court in In
re Spence 64 held that an intervention to protect a child from his parent
or guardian was proper in the absence of property. Lord Chancellor
Cottenham announced:
I have no doubt about the jurisdiction. The cases in which this
Court interferes on behalf of infants, are not confined to those
in which there is property. Courts of law interfere by habeas
for the protection of the person of any body who is suggested to
be improperly detained. This Court interferes for the protec-
tion of infants, qua infants by virtue of the prerogative which
belongs to the Crown as parens patriae, and the exercise of
which is delegated to the Great Seal.05
In contrast to the equity court, the courts at law considered custody
strictly a parental prerogative66 with two narrowly construed excep-
58. 23 Eng. Rep. 814 (Ch. 1696).
59. Id. at 818. Other reports of the case do not include the term pater patriae.
See Cogan, supra note 56, at 167-68. Curiously, the infant in Falkland lost her claim
in the Court of Chancery and only later prevailed in the House of Lords. See Falkland
v. Bertie, 1 Eng. Rep. 155, 156 (H.L. 1697).
60. See Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (Ch. 1721).
61. See Butler v. Freeman, 27 Eng. Rep. 204 (Ch. 1756).
62. 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827).
63. Id. at 243.
64. 41 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ch. 1847).
B5. Id. at 938.
66. See De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 59 (Ch. 1804). Originally only
fathers had custody rights and they could enforce them even against a child's mother.
See 9 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 772 (T. Chitty ed. 1929). In 1839 Parlia-
ment authorized chancery to award children under seven to mothers. 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54
(1889). In 1873 Parliament extended chancery's power; chancery thereafter could
award children under 16 to their mothers. The Custody of Infants Act, 36 & 37 Vict.,
C. 12 (1873).
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tions The law courts did not use the parens patriae concept of
determining and acting on the best interests of the child.
The Elizabethan Poor Law thus had established what Professor
tenBroek later termed a dual standard of law for families.68 For the
poor, state intervention between parent and child was not only per-
mitted but encouraged in order to effectuate a number of public
policies, ranging from the provision of relief at minimum cost to the
prevention of future crime. For all others, the state would separate
children from parents only in the most extreme circumstances, and
then only when private parties initiated court action.
3. Reception by the Colonies. The American colonies soon
adopted the Elizabethan policy of binding out poor children for work
or training; the policy was well suited to the needs and ethics of a
pioneer society where even small children were expected and required
to make themselves useful.69 While some eighteenth century statutes
reflected a growing interest in education,7 0 the majority of neglect
statutes continued to focus on family income or idleness as the justi-
fication for separating children from their parents.71  Similarly, some
67. See Rex v. De Manneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804); In re John, 11 Jr.
R.C.L. 1, 26 (1859).
68. See tenBroek I, supra note 32, at 257-58. Blackstone observed:
Our laws, though their defects in this particular cannot be denied, have
in one instance made a wide provision for breeding up the rising genera-
ation: since the poor and laborious part of the community, when past the
age of nurture, are taken out of the bands of their parents, by the statutes
for apprenticing poor children . . . and are placed out by the public in
such a manner, as may render their abilities, in their several stations, of
the greatest advantage to the commonwealth .... The rich, indeed, are
left at their own option, whether they will breed up their children to be
ornaments or disgraces to their family.
I W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 48, at 451.
69. See I CHILDREN A'D YouTm iN AMERICA 103-04 (R. Bremner ed. 1970). See
generally Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL.
L. REv. 175 (1955) (detailed survey of adoption of Elizabethan poor laws by American
colonies).
70. See ch. 4, [1735] Mass. Sess. 541. This early Massachusetts statute reflected
concern for at least rudimentary skills: "Where persons bring up their children in
such gross ignorance that they do not know, or are not able to distinguish the alphabet
or twenty-four letters at the age of six years, the overseers might bind the children out
to good families for a decent and Christian education." Id.
71. See H. FOLKS, TiE CARE OF DESTrrUTE, NEGLECTED AND DEL N QUENT CHILDREN
167-68 (reprint 1970). In 1673, for example, Connecticut provided that:
In any person or persons that have had or shall have relief or supplies
from any town, shall suffer their children to live idly or misspend their
time loitering, and to bring them up in such or employ them in some
honest calling which may be profitable unto themselves and the public;
or if there be any family that cannot, or dotes] not provide competently
for their children, whereby they are exposed to want and extremity; it
shall be lawful for the selectman and overseers of the poor in each town
and they are hereby ordered and empowered with the assent of the next
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of the early statutes authorized the separation of children from any
parents who failed to care for them rather than only from poor pa-
rents,72 but the authorities nonetheless apparently understood that only
the children of the poor were to be taken by the state.73
The common law courts in the colonies, like those in England,
provided little protection for children beyond the ambit of the protec-
tion given poor children under the poor law statutes. Courts of law
in America did take some initiative in protecting the best interests of
children instead of deferring entirely to the father.74 Some fathers
therefore lost custody of the child to the mother,7" and a few parents
lost custody to nonparents.76 With the exception of infrequent crim-
inal prosecutions, however, no suits involving custody were initiated
by the state, and even in the criminal prosecutions, courts only rarely
separated nonpoor children and parents."
magistrate or justice of the peace, to bind any poor children belonging
to such town to be apprentices ....
Acts and Laws of His Majesties Colony of Connecticut in New England 95-96 (1715),
reprinted in 1 CHMDREN AND YouTH, supra note 69, at 68.
72. See 6 Va. Stat. 32 (Hening 1819). The 1748 Virginia statute provided:
"[W]here any person or persons shall be, by their county court, judged incapable of
supporting and bringing up their child or children in honest courses , . . it shall be
lawful for the church wardens of the parish . . . by order of their county court, to
bind every such child or children apprentices, in the same manner, and under such
covenants and conditions as the law directs for poor orphan children." Id., reprinted in
1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 69, at 263.
73. See 1 CHMDREN AND YoUTH, supra note 69, at 65-71, 262-68.
74. W. T=FANY, supra note 21, at 246-52. The first recorded American opinion
recognizing the best interests standard apparently is Mercein v. People. 35 Am. Dec.
653 (N.Y. 1840). The court in Mercein allowed a sick, three year old child to remain
with the mother because the interest of the infant was found to be paramount. See id.
at 663-65. While the court claimed that it was applying an established American
principle, it failed to cite any supportive American authority.
Subsequently, in Marshall v. Reams a court denied a custody claim made by a child's
uncle because he had administered immoderate and cruel punishment to the child. 32
Fla. 499, 506-07, 14 S. 95, 97 (1893). Citing Mercein as authority, the court acknowl-
edged that mothers have a right to transfer custody of their illegitimate children, but
held that in the case before it the welfare of the child required denial of the uncle's
petition, despite the fact that the mother had indicated that the uncle should have
custody. Id. at 502, 14 S. at 96.
75. See Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 656-57 (1881); Mercein v. People, 35 Am.
Dec. 653, 663 (N.Y. 1840). In Chapsky the court, in denying a father's request for
custody of his daughter, distinguished a parent's custodial right from an absolute
property right. 26 Kan. at 652-53. The court commented, "No case can be found
in which courts have given to the father who was a drunkard and a man of gross im-
moralities the custody of a minor child, especially when that child was a girt." Id. at
653.
76. See Gamer v. Gordon, 41 Ind. 93 (1872) (unrelated person appointed guar-
dian); Dumain v. Gwynne, 92 Mass. 270 (1865) (charitable institution).
77. See Johnson v. State, 21 Tenn. 183 (1841). Johnson was the first American
appeal involving a conviction of parents for child abuse. The defendants were ac-
cused of striking their child, tying him to a bedpost, and whipping him. The jury
found them guilty of assault and battery. Id. at 184. The appellate court remanded
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As in England, the poor children found to be neglected were bound
out for work or apprenticeship.7 8 Again, the process reflected a desire
to minimize welfare costs and to train children to work, rather than
simple class bias. The Puritans and the Quakers in particular firmly
believed that work was an integral part of the training of children. 9
Many parents voluntarily apprenticed their children, both for financial
and for educational reasons. New York provided that any male infant
or unmarried female under eighteen might be bound as an apprentice
or steward if consent was given by the infant's father if he was alive
and able to consent, by the mother if the father could not give consent,
by a duly appointed guardian if both parents were dead or incapac-
itated, or by the overseers of the poor or any judge of the county
courts.8 0
Indentures for children bound out by either county superintendents
or overseers of the poor in New York had to contain an agreement
that the child would receive instruction in reading and writing. A
male child had to receive instruction in arithmetic as well."' These
educational requirements, common throughout the colonies, later were
extended to voluntarily apprenticed children and constituted the only
significant American improvement in traditional English apprentice-
ship procedures.82
the case, however, on the ground that the jury had been instructed improperly on their
duty to determine whether the punishment inflicted by the parents was excessive.
Similarly, in State v. Jones the defendant was charged with whipping and choking
his sixteen year old daughter without cause. 95 N.C. 465 (1886). On appeal, a
guilty verdict was reversed on the grounds that the law should not interfere in the
domestic affairs of families unless the punishment causes permanent injury or is in-
flicted with a malicious nature and without honest purpose. Id. at 468. By contrast,
in Fletcher v. People the court held that it was needless cruelty and false imprisonment
to keep a blind child in a damp cellar during mid-winter without cause. 52 Ill. 395,
396-97 (1869). As a result the defendant father was convicted of false imprisonment
and sentenced to pay a $300 fine. Id.
78. Child labor remained unregulated until well after the Civil War. Even when
regulation began, it was confined to limitations on hours and did not prohibit child
labor. See 1 G. ABBOTT, supra note 35, at 260-61. In 1880, when organized labor
called for an end to the employment of children under fourteen, the motivation ap-
parently was as much a desire to protect union jobs as a genuine concern for children.
See M. CARROLL, LABOR AND PoLrmcs 81 (1923). As late as 1900, nearly one out of
five children between ten and fifteen years of age was employed. See 2 CHILDREN
AND YoUT , supra note 69, at 605.
79. See 1 G. ABBOTT, supra note 35, at 270-71. In 1640, an order of the General
Court of Massachusetts requiring the magistrates of the several towns to see "what
course may be taken for teaching the boyes and girles in all forms the spinning of the
yarne" revealed the Puritan view. Id. at 270. Similar Quaker beliefs were embodied
in an early Pennsylvania law, which provided that all children "of the age of tvelve
years shall be taught some useful trade or skill, to the end none may be Idle." Id.
at 271.
80. 3 N.Y. Rzv. STAT. Part III, ch. 8, tit. 4, art. 1, §§ 1-2 (1827).
81. See id. § 11.
82. See 1 CHILDREN ANM YoUTH, supra note 69, at 105.
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The indentures were supposed to last for three to five years, but
they frequently lasted far longer.83 Similarly, employers theoretically
were obligated to provide suitable board, lodging, and medical atten-
tion, but penalties for failure to meet these obligations resulted only
if the apprentice or his parent or guardian pursued a successful tort
action or a court imposed fine. 4 Taking an apprentice unlawfully
meant only that the master might be found guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by a $500 fine.85 Apprentices who violated their inden-
tures, by contrast, could be imprisoned until they were 21 or returned,
like runaway slaves, to serve as punishment double the time they were
absent .8 Although binding out was a widely used method of caring for
neglected children prior to and during the nineteenth century,8T the
minimum age for binding out increased over the years, perhaps be-
cause of a growing recognition of the special needs of children but
more probably because the spread of slavery and the greater avail-
ability of adult manpower made the labor of young children less at-
tractive to employers.8 Until old enough to be bound out, poor
children were either maintained in their own homes at public expense
under a system known as "outdoor relief," or were boarded out to
private families, again at public expense." New England communities
devised a thrifty variant of boarding out known as "vendue," whereby
the town officials auctioned local poor to the lowest bidders, whose
bid represented what the bidder would charge the state for boarding
the poor 0
83. See id. at 104. "Voluntary apprentices normally served for seven years ....
Compulsory apprentices on the other hand served until they were twenty-one, regardless
of their age at the time of indenture. Since some were placed in infancy, their term
of service often far exceeded seven years." Id.
84. See ch. 931, § 5, [1871] N.Y. Laws, 94th Sess. 2149 (fine of $100 to $1000
authorized).
85. See id. § 18.
86. See id. § 39.
87. Outdoor relief was the system of care provided for most pauper children and
adults at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but binding out also was in general
use. See H. Fotxs, supra note 71 at 4, 8; 1 CmILDREN AND YouTH, supra note 69 at
64. A typical indenture agreement of the time stressed both the obedient behavior
expected of the apprentice and the duties of the master owed to the apprentice. See
D. CA Y, HIsToRY OF MALDEN 403 (1899), reprinted in R. KELso, supra note 29,
at 169-70.
88. For example, in 1834 the almshouse on Long Island adopted a rule that girls
under the age of 10 and boys under 12 should not be bound out. See H. FoLics,
supra note 71, at 17. In 1847, an almshouse commissioner concluded that girls should
not leave the institution before they were 13 and that boys should not leave until they
were 15. Id. at 20.
89. See id. at 3-4.
90. See A. MARvIN, HisTony OF WINC-ENDON MASSAcHUusS 267-68 (1868),
reprinted in 1 CHI DREN AND YouTm, supra note 69, at 267-68. Vendue literally
means "sale" in French, and the system sometimes was called "selling the poor." Id.
at 268. See also S. ADAMS, GRANDFATHER STOruES 282-87 (1955).
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B. REFORMS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Neglect proceedings in the nineteenth century continued to be pri-
marily part of the poor relief program, but they gradually were ex-
panded to protect children from parental immorality 9 and abuse.
The first state intervention to protect a child from parental abuse
occurred in 1874. According to the more dramatic versions of the
episode, eight-year-old Mary Ellen Wilson was rescued only through
the efforts of the recently formed New York Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals, which argued that children were, after all,
members of the animal kingdom. 2  Within a few months the first
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was formed in New
York City by Elbridge Gerry, who had argued Mary Wilson's cause.93
The Society's records demonstrate that poverty, rather than cruelty,
continued to be the major justification for family interventions, despite
the organization's professed dedication to protecting children from
cruelty.94 Further, the Society focused on punishing cruel parents
91. New York provided in 1833 that the mayor, recorder, any two alderman, or
two special justices might commit to the almshouse or other suitable place any child
found in a state of need or suffering, or abandoned, improperly exposed, neglected,
soliciting charity from door to door, or whose mother was a notorious or immoral
woman. See H. FoLrxs, supra note 71, at 169. See also People v. Giles, 152 N.Y.
136, 46 N.E. 326 (1897) (children found in house of prostitution held to be neg-
lected); People ex rel. Van Riper v. New York Catholic Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604, 13
N.E. 435 (1887) (child in company of prostitute held to be neglected); In re Diss
Debar, 3 N.Y.S. 667 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (children of adulteress convicted of fraud held
to be neglected).
92. See R. McCrEA, THE HumANE MovEmmNT 135 (1910). Contemporary re-
ports of the Wilson intervention reflected the growing concern for the emotional needs
of children and a diminution of the earlier preoccupation with proper work habits.
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1874, at 8, col. 2.
Mary Ellen Wilson was not removed from her biological parents, as is commonly
assumed, but from foster parents. Her case thus reveals more about the neglect of
children placed in state custody than about parental neglect. Significantly, at the
end of the proceedings so often hailed in social work literature, Mary Ellen was sent
off to an institution; she was "saved"-but only in the sense of being removed from
her foster parents, the Connollys. Apparently no one has ever bothered to find out
how she fared after she was placed by the state a second time. Her case is a curious
landmark for social work agencies, although those of us who criticize the agencies for
often failing to provide adequate dispositions for the children they take into custody
might consider it an apt selection. See generally 2 CmLDBEN AND YoUTH, supra note
69, at 185-92.
93. See R. McCnFA, supra note 92, at 135-41. The Society announced that it was
organized to rescue from "the dens and slums of the City the little unfortunates
whose lives were rendered miserable by the system of cruelty and abuse which was
constantly practiced upon them by the human brutes who happened to possess the
custody and control of them." N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1874, at 3, col. 2, reprinted in
2 CHiLDREN AND YotrrH, supra note 69, at 190.
94. During its first ten months of operation, the New York Society brought 72
cases to court attention. The cruelty charges ranged from one against a park police.
man for throwing a small boy into the basin of a fountain, wetting the child all over,
and sending him home in that condition to one against a father for beating his son
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rather than on the provision of better environments for children."'
The Society's efforts facilitated passage of a neglect statute authorizing
any New York court that convicted a parent for criminal abuse or
neglect to commit their children to an orphanage or to effect any
other disposition that was available for pauper children.", The new
statute focused principally on preventing the exploitation of children
for commercial purposes rather than on enhancing their physical or
emotional development. 7
The dispositions provided for neglected children in the nineteenth
century clearly confirm the lack of concern with the emotional needs
of children and the growing movement to punish parents. At the
beginning of the century, the outdoor relief system was widely at-
tacked. Complaining of parents who were loafers and chiselers, the
Massachusetts Committee on Pauper Laws in its 1821 report concluded
that outdoor relief was the worst method of relief, and that almshouse
care was the most economical and best method, especially when it
provided work opportunities.9" In 1824, the secretary of state in New
York reported similar views to his legislature. " In the same year,
New York established the first system of county poorhouses in the
country. 0 Within a decade fifty counties had erected such institu-
tions.10
over the head with the butt end of a whip. See N.Y. SocIErY FOR THE PREVENTION
OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, Frst ANNUA I REPORT 30-31 (1876). Only twenty of
the first cases involved abuse, however, while over forty were in response to poverty.
See id. at 30-44. A surprisingly large number of the cases involved organ grinders
who were using children to aid in their begging routines. See id. at 34-37.
95. See id. at 6-7. The Society's report noted that other institutions had failed
to enforce adequately statutes passed to punish persons who mistreated children. Id.
96. See ch. 122, § 3, [1876] N.Y. Laws 99th Sess. 96. Section 1 of the statute
made it a misdemeanor for persons having custody of children to use or employ the
children in singing, dancing, begging, or other immoral practices. Id. § 1. When-
ever a court determined that a child had been so used, the court could "commit such
child to an orphan asylum, charitable or other institution, or make such other dis-
position thereof as now is or hereafter may be provided by law in cases of vagrant,
truant, disorderly, pauper or destitute children." Id. § 3.
97. See id. § 1. The early preoccupation with the exploitation of children by
circuses survives in many criminal as well as civil statutes. In the District of Columbia,
for example, it is a misdemeanor for any person "having in his custody or control
a child under the age of fourteen years, who shall in any way dispose of it with a
view to its being employed as a acrobat, or a gymnast, or a contortionist, or a circus
rider, or a rope walker, or in any exhibition of like dangerous character, or as a beg-
gar, or mendicant, or pauper, or street singer, or street musician; . . ." D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-901 (1973).
98. See Report of the Massachusetts Committee on the Pauper Laws (1821), rc-
printed in PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATEs 34 (S. Brecken-
ridge ed. 1970).
99. Report and Other Papers on Subject of Laws for Relief and Settlement of
Poor, reprinted in Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the State Board of Charities of the
State of New York 939-63 (1900).
100. See ch. 331, [1824] N.Y. Laws 47th Sess. 384.
101. See M. BRANSCOMBE, THE CounT AND THE POOR LAWs IN NEw YORK STATE
1784-1929, at 30-31, 35-36 (1943).
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In retrospect, it is hard to understand why almshouses were con-
sidered a reform; at the time, however, reformers believed that the
state could better instill in children proper work attitudes and skills
if it used publicly managed institutions instead of leaving children
with their own poor and therefore suspect parents.O'0 Some soon rec-
ognized, however, that state control was achieved at the cost of con-
taminating the children with the "bad attitudes" of their adult com-
patriots in the almshouses. 10 3
Criticism of the almshouses grew dramatically during the 1820s and
1830s. In 1844, the prominent reformer Dorothea Dix denounced the
conditions in the almshouses of New York and condemned particularly
the commingling of children with adults and the lack of education.'04
Not surprisingly, the movement to replace outdoor relief with alms-
houses soon was followed by an additional reform, the establishment
of separate institutions for children. 0 5 New York, one of the first
states to respond, established a separate facility for children on Ran-
dal's Island in 1848. The establishment of separate facilities did not
result immediately, however, in the improvement of the treatment
of children. In 1849, 280 of the 514 infants in New York's new facility
reportedly died of cholera. 06 Moreover, by 1867, 2300 children re-
sided in almshouses in New York, compared with 1300 in 1856,0
despite the strong criticism of poorhouses issued in an official report
in 1856.108 Interestingly, pressure to establish separate institutions
for children ultimately emerged less in response to the horrors of the
almshouses than as incident to the growing movement to separate
juvenile and adult offenders in correctional institutions.'0 9 It is strik-
102. See Yates, The Relief and Settlement of the Poor (1824), reprinted in PUBLic
WELFARE Am INISTATION r TH UNrrED STATES, supra note 98, at 39, 50.
103. A contemporary observer characterized a nineteenth century almshouse in
Steuben County, N.Y., as a haven for insane, imbecilic, diseased, and decrepit adults.
See Letchworth, Report on Pauper and Destitute Children, quoted in 2 G. ABBOTT,
supra note 35, at 70-71. Letchworth described one group of adults with whom
children were intermingled as follows: "Here was an insane woman raving and utter-
ing gibberings, a half crazy man was sardonically grinning, and an overgrown idiotic
boy of malicious disposition was teasing, I might say torturing, one of the little boys.
There were several others adults of low types of humanity." Id.
104. See H. FoLxs, supra note 71, at 38.
105. See id. at 38-39, 72-81.
106. See H. FoLxs, supra note 71, at 20-21.
107. See 2 G. ABBOTT, supra note 35, at 6.
108. In 1856, a Select Committee appointed by the New York Senate to investigate
all the charitable institutions of the state reported that the poorhouses were "the most
disgraceful memorials of public charity," that the evidence obtained showed "filth,
nakedness, licentiousness, general bad morals-gross neglect of the most ordinary com-
forts and decencies of life," and that the institutions were "for the young the worst
possible nurseries." See 1 CIDREN AND YouTm, supra note 69, at 647.
109. See generally A. PLATT, THE CmrL= SAvEas 46-74 (1969) (discussion of
development of reformatory penology); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1188-92 (1970) (discussion of first New York
separate children's institution).
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ing that the founders of the first children's institutions realized that
even those institutions were not good places for children and intended
the institutions to be only temporary or transitional places for care.n0
Charles Loring Brace, an early critic of institutional care, organized
the Children's Aid Society in New York in 1830 to place needy children
with families in the West."' Brace justified these out-of-state place-
ments with the remarkably modem view that "the ordinary experience
of life in an ordinary family are [sic] a better preparation for self-
support and self-guidance than institutional training." 2 In the end,
however, Brace did much to encourage the placement of children in
institutions rather than with families, for widespread dissatisfaction
began to develop with his out-of-state placements."13  Critics com-
plained that there was no guarantee of religious matching of the
children and their new families, that there was no supervision of care
110. Thus at the Fourth Annual Conference of Charities in 1877, Theodore Roose-
velt observed: "Benevolent ladies think that during their early years [neglected]
children should be guarded from temptation, and that this is best accomplished by
keeping them in an institution. The fact is, that they are less able to bear temptation
when brought up in an institution. In the event of dependent children being sup-
ported by the state, a law should be passed, limiting the time when the state should
provide for such children in any institution. They should be transferred to families
as fast as possible." Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference of Charities 79
(1877).
111. See Proceedings of the Conference of Charities Held in Connection with the
General Meeting of the American Social Science Association (1875), reprinted in 2
G. Annorr, supra note 35, at 371-78.
112. C. BnACE, THE DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEv YORK AND TwENTY YEARS OF
WORK AmONG THEm (1872). Brace believed that out-of-state placements of children
into family units would avoid the deleterious effects that slum life has upon children.
Even the title of his work reflected the nineteenth century belief that poverty, sin,
and crime were linked. A few excerpts present the full flavor of this influential book:
[Tlhough the crime and pauperism of New York are not so deeply
stamped in the blood of the population, they are even more dangerous.
The intensity of the American temperament is felt in every fiber of
these children of poverty and vice.
[T]he young ruffians of New York are the products of accident, ignorance,
and vice ...
There are thousands on thousands in New York who have no assign-
able home, and "flit" from attic to attic, and cellar to cellar; there are
other thousands more or less connected with criminal enterprises; and
still other tens of thousands, poor, hardpressed, and depending for daily
bread on the day's earnings, swarming in tenement-houses, who behold the
the gilded rewards of toil all about them, but are never permitted to touch
them ....
Id. at 26-29.
113. One study claimed that the Society between 1853 and 1880 placed between
40,000 and 50,000 children out of state. See E. WINES, THE STATE OF PRISONS 129
(1880 ed., reprint 1968). But see H. FOLKS, supra note 71, at 68 (estimated place-
ment of 1,000 per year between 1854 and 1875). Some states considered the problem
serious enough to pass statutes barring unapproved interstate placements. See generally
2 G. ABBOTT, supra note 35, at 133-63.
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after the children were placed, and that sheer physical distance made
it difficult if not impossible for parents to reclaim their children after
the parents overcame the hardship that had caused their temporary
inability to care for the children."4
In 1875 the opposition to almshouse care of children finally was
codified in New York." 5 Removal of children from almshouses was
merely a stopgap reform, however, since the problem of where to
place the children remained. New York responded to the displace-
ment challenge by authorizing local communities either to subsidize
private child care agencies or to develop a new system of public
institutions."' Most communities adopted the subsidy system, and
private institutions multiplied and flourished." 7
Variations on the New York model abounded. Ohio and several
other states established county orphanages," 8 while Michigan estab-
114. See H. THUBSTON, THE DEPENDENT CHILD 127 (1930).
115. See ch. 173, § 1, [1875] N.Y. Laws 150. The statute made it unlawful "to
commit any child, over 3 and under 16 years of age, as vagrant, truant or disorderly,
to any county poorhouse" or "to send any child as a pauper to any such poorhouse
for support and care, unless such child be an unteachable idiot, an epileptic, or para-
lytic, or be otherwise defective, diseased or deformed, so as to render it unfit for
family care." Id.
116. See ch. 173, § 2, [1875] N.Y. Laws 150.
117. The subsidy system set the stage for later confrontation with public officials
over the public regulation of privately sponsored but publicly supported institutions.
See Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), cited in 1 FA. L.
REP. 3005 (1974). Moreover, as Folks pointed out, this system encouraged the
rowth of large institutions because funding generally was provided on a per capita
asis, and it discouraged foster care, or the "placing-out" system, as it was then
termed. See H. Forxs, supra note 71, at 120-22. During the 1880s, the number of
private institutions throughout the state of New York increased dramatically from 132
institutions caring for 11,907 children to 204 institutions caring for 23,592 children.
By 1888 in New York City alone 15,000 children were being cared for in private
institutions. Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), cited in
1 F.!. L. REP. 3005, 3006 (1974).
In 1894 the New York State Constitution was amended to provide that local gov-
ernments should not pay for the care of dependent children in any private institution
not certified by the State Board of Charities. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 14. An in-
vestigation made in 1914, however, revealed shocking conditions in some of the
"certified institutions:
There were found institutions in which antiquated methods of puni~h-
ment prevailed, not inhumane or even necessarily cruel, but indicat-
ing an utter misconception of the kind of discipline that will genuinely
improve even an exceptionally unruly child; such punishments, for ex-
ample, as striking a child on the head with a key, making him spend
part of his fifteen minutes at dinner standing with his face to the wall,
making him sit on the floor behind the bed, making him wear bi-
colored trousers, whipping large girls with a strap on the hands.
Report of C. Strong, reprinted in 2 G. ABBOTT, supra note 35, at 118.
118. See H. FoLKS, supra note 71, at 103-14 (description of county home practice).
Some observers found, however, that the Ohio approach, like that of New York, tended
to place more children in institutions than was desirable. As late as 1933, 56 county
homes in Ohio were caring for some 8,014 children. 2 G. ABBOTT, supra note 35,
at 14.
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lished both a state school for dependent children, which was given
the power to bind out the children, and a local option to establish
separate institutions for children."' Massachusetts, by contrast, au-
thorized local officials and, if the local officials failed, state officials to
place out children in the first large scale foster-care program.12 ° Ironi-
cally, however, while Massachusetts avoided the deleterious emphasis
on institutional placements, as late as 1923 it had more children in
almshouses than did any other state.121
Regardless of the theoretical solution adopted, many states had
trouble developing effective safeguards to ensure quality care. For
example, in 1881 the newly strengthened New York neglect provisions
were applied to an officer of a child saving institution who was found
to have neglected to provide a child with wholesome and sufficient
food, clothing, medicine and sanitation, and thereby to have injured
the child's health.122  Moreover, the child saving institutions often
served merely as an intermediate placement step, because many were
empowered to bind out their charges to private families in a confused
mixture of adoption and on-the-job training.12
While many factors may have contributed to the expansion of the
parens patriae role of the late nineteenth century to include the protec-
tion of children from physical abuse, one factor, deserves particular
attention because of the light it may shed on contemporary neglect
problems. That factor is the widespread change in attitudes toward
parental discipline that began in the nineteenth century. The best
evidence indicates, for example, that canings and whippings were
widespread among all classes in America, and persisted until the last
two generations. Old fashioned whipping did not diminish in popu-
119. See H. FOLKS, supra note 71, at 82-102; 2 G. ABBOTr, supra note 35, at 12-14.
120. See H. FoLKs, supra note 71, at 73-74.
121. In 1923 Massachusetts still had 367 children in almshouses; New York, by
contrast, had only 16. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Paupers in Almshouses Table 61,
at 50 (1923), reprinted in 2 G. ABBOTT, supra note 35, at 12 n.2.
122. Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 468-70 (1881).
123. An 1884 New York statute, for example, 'provided that childrens institutions
were authorized to bind out children who had been surrendered there as paupers or
had been left by their parent or legal guardian with no provision for support for at least
one year. Ch. 438, § 5 [1884] N.Y. Laws 512-13.
124. See de Mause, The Evolution of Childhood, 1 HisT. OF CHILDHOOD Q. 503,
544-45 (1974). Indeed, Lloyd de Mause concluded that prior to the eighteenth
century a large percentage of the children born in Europe and the United States
would be considered battered children by modem standards. See id. at 542. See
also Radbill, A History of Child Abuse and Infanticide in THE BATTERED CHILD 3
(R. Heifer & C. Kempe eds. 1968).
Any indictment of past child care must be qualified, however. While some parents
throughout history have believed it wrong to discipline their children too strictly,
many who might seem cruel by modem standards were motivated by a sincere desire
to do what then was considered best for their children rather than by sadism or
cruelty.
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lar acceptance in most of Europe and America until the nineteenth
century.125  Even in the early twentieth century, child care experts
continued to counsel parents to train their children firmly in order to
discourage bad habits. 26 However, it is clear that the social consensus
concerning proper parental behavior began to change at the close of
the nineteenth century.
The ambivalence society felt toward the reform of parental .discip-
line is nowhere better revealed than in the concurrent movement
toward use of the neglect process to prevent delinquency. 2 7 One
sign of this merger of benevolence and hostility toward wayward
youth was the unprecedented use of the parens patriae power to jus-
tify the new and sweeping juvenile delinquency statutes. 28 The
125. A discussion of corporal punishment in an English magazine in the 1860s
revealed a fairly even division of parents between those who indicated they were ap-
palled at the very idea and others who reported, with evident satisfaction, the beneficial
results they achieved. See de Mause, supra note 124, at 416. Whipping survived
longest in Germany; 80 percent of German parents still admit that they beat their
children. See id. at 544.
126. In 1928 John Watson proposed a "sensible way" to treat children:
Treat them as though they were young adults. Dress them, bathe them
with care and circumspection. Let your behaviour always be objective
and kindly firm. Never hug and kiss them, never let them sit in your
lap. If you must, kiss them on the forehead when they say goodnight.
Shake hands with them in the morning. Give them a pat on the head
if they have made an extraordinary good job of a difficult task. Try
it out. In a week's time, you will find how easy it is to be perfectly
objective with your child and at the same time kindly. You will be
utterly ashamed of the mawkish sentimental way you have been hand-
ling it.
J. WATSON, PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE OF INFANT AND CHILD 81-82 (1928). Watson
claimed that his method would produce "a child as free as possible of sensitivities to
people and one who, almost from birth, is relatively independent of the family situa-
tion." Id. at 186. This prompted two modem authorities on child development to
speculate that Watson himself had been hurt deeply in his interpersonal relations and
had proposed this almost psychopathic style of life as a defense against emotional
pain. See L. STONE & J. CHURnCH, CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE: 115-16 (3d ed.
1973).
127. Elbridge Gerry, president of the New York Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children, told the Ninth Annual Conference of Charities in 1882 that
"physical cruelty is the parent of vice. Want and neglect are the incentives to crime.
And crime not only destroys its perpetrator, but eats like a corroding ulcer into the
nation which countenances its existence." NInTH AruAL CONFERENCE OF CHARrrIES
AND CORRECTIONS, PROCE IDNGS 130 (A. Wright ed. 1883).
128. See Van Walters v. Board of Childreds Guardians, 132 Ind. 567, 569-70, 32
N.E. 568, 569 (1892). The court in Van Walters noted the balance between state
and familial interests, and concluded:
It has been for many centuries theoretically true that the state, through
its appropriate organs, is the guardian of the clhildren within its borders
.... [But] it is still true that the equally great principle that natural
right vests in parents the custody and control of their children is-con-
firmed and enforced. This high and strong natural right yields only
when the welfare of society or the children themselves comes into con-
flict with it; but where there is such conflict the supreme right of
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merger was so successful that it was not challenged until 1967,12" and
even then the challenges met with mixed results. 30
C. T=E MODERN ERA
1. Contemporary Standards. Two major changes in the goals
of neglect enforcement occurred in the beginning of the twentieth
century. First, changes in the poor relief system, particularly the
development of "mother's aid" and aid to dependent children '31 made
it possible for states to stop removing children from parents because
of family poverty; for the first time poverty became a defense to
rather than a ground for a neglect finding. 32 This new distinction
between neglect and destitution was highlighted by a 1930 New
York statute which provided that destitute children were to be
housed separately from those who were delinquent, neglected, or
abandoned.13  Not until 1962, when poverty in theory became an
guardianship asserts itself for the protection of society and the pro-
motion of the welfare of the ward of the commonwealth .... The
statute violates no constitutional principle, inasmuch as it guards the
interests and rights of parents by requiring that their children shall not
be taken from them without a hearing, upon due notice, in the courts
of the State. As a check to an abuse of power and the exercise of
arbitrary authority by the courts of original jurisdiction, it provides
for the right of appeal to the highest court of the State.
Id. See also In re Ferrier, 103 II. 367, 371-73 (1882) (parens patriae extends to
care and protection of ill-treated children); State v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 358, 52
N.W. 935, 936 (1892) (state assumes parental duty consonant with parens patriae);
Milwaukee Indus. School v. Supervisors, 40 Wis. 328, 337-40 (1876) (state commit-
ment of children does not invade parents' natural rights).
129. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-26, 30 (1967).
130. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-50 (1971) (no constitutional
guarantee of jury trial in adjudicative phase of juvenile proceeding); Note, Ungovern.
ability, The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YAL L.J. 1383, 1391-1404 (1974) (juris-
dictional overreach in judicial juvenile control).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-26 (1935). See generally 3 CUMLDREN AND YOUTH, supra
note 69, at 519-609.
132. In 1922, New York redefined a neglected child as one "whose parents, guardian
or custodian neglects and refuses when able to do so to provide necessary medical,
surgical, institutional or hospital care." Ch. 547, art. I, § 2(4)(f) (1922] N.Y. Laws
1261. By labelling a child "destitute" rather than neglected, however, the state
retained the power to intervene in a family because of poverty. Id. § 5. Subsection
7 of the 1922 statute defined a destitute child as one "who through no neglect on the
part of its parents or custodian is destitute or homeless, or in a state of want or suf-
fering due to lack of sufficient food, clothing, shelter, medical or surgical care." Id.
§ 2(7).
133. See ch. 393, art. III, § 2 2(g) [1930] N.Y. Laws 839. See also Common-
wealth v. Dee, 222 Mass. 184, 110 N.E. 287 (1915) (purpose of neglect law was
to provide for the removal of children from those parents who are undesirable and
unfit, and not from parents who are merely poor).
The legislature apparently was more willing to distinguish between children whose
parents intentionally neglected them and children whose parents did not, than to
distinguish and separate children who were passive victims of parental neglect from
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absolute defense to state intervention in New York, was the change
begun in 1922 made complete. The legislature abolished the destitute
child category and redefined a neglected child as one "whose parent
or other person legally responsible for his care does not adequately
supply the child with food, clothing, shelter, education, or medical
or surgical care, though financially able or offered financial means to
do so."1 34 Unfortunately, a second section of the 1962 statute allowed
its application to families who were simply poor or unconventional,
for neglect was defined also to include "improper guardianship, includ-
ing lack of moral supervision or guidance."' 35 The vagueness of this
standard was tempered only slightly by a requirement that the state
show that the child "suffers or is likely to suffer serious harm" from
the improper guardianship and that the child "required the aid of the
court," before the statute could be invoked. 30
The second major change in neglect practice in the twentieth cen-
tury was the expansion of the parens patriae role of the states to
encompass protection of children from emotional as well as physical
harm. Often this change was accompanied by a revision of statutes
that made parental immorality a basis for state intervention. In New
York, for example, impairment of emotional health and impairment
of mental or emotional condition were made grounds for intervention
in 1970, while "lack of moral supervision" was eliminated.' 37 Similarly,
in 1963 Idaho authorized intervention where a child was "emotionally
maladjusted" or where a child who had been denied proper parental
love or affectionate association "behaves unnaturally and unrealistically
in relation to normal situations, objects, and other persons." as
children accused of committing crimes. Today, the prohibition against commingling
of neglected and delinquent children is widely considered a necessary facet of a model
juvenile system. Differentiation between neglected children and juvenile offenders
was the practice as early as the sixteenth century when juvenile offenders were in-
carcerated with adult offenders. The reform of the juvenile court, which resulted in
the removal of juvenile offenders from adult jails, first created the problem of the
commingling of delinquent and neglected children.
134. Ch. 686, art. I, § 312(a) [1962] N.Y. Laws 3066.
135. Id. § 312(b).
136. Id.
137. Ch. 962, art. 10, § 1012(f)(i), [1970] N.Y. Laws 2995. The New York
legislature in 1972 provided a more specific definition of these new phrases; impair-
ment of emotional health was defined as:
a state of substantially diminished psychological or intellectual function-
ing in relation to, but not limited to such factors as failure to think,
control of aggressiveness or self destructive impulses, ability to think
and reason, or acting out or misbehaviour, including incorrigibility, un-
governability or habitual truancy; provided, however, that such impair-
ment must be clearly attributable to the unwillingness or inability of
the respondent to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child.
N.Y. FnLY CT. ACT § 1012(h) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
138. IDAHO CODE § 16-1625(j) (Supp. 1974).
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These changes undoubtedly reflect the influence of both Freud and
a growing body of child development specialists, who documented the
emotional needs of children and affirmed the importance of being
raised in a family.' 39 The state's new interest in protecting children
from emotional harm, then, confronted the newly recognized interest
in avoiding' separation of parents and children. Dispositions in the
twentieth century nevertheless have lagged behind the statutory ideals
and reforms, because even the most progressive states continue to
ignore the importance of family ties in several important respects.
2. Modern Dispositions. While the dangers of raising children
in institutions is well documented' 40 and the trend is away from in-
stitutional care, 14' thousands of children remain in institutions. 42 Fur-
ther, although foster care, the most frequent disposition employed
today, is in most cases better for children than institutional care, courts
too often overlook the fact that foster care usually is not superior to
family care. 43
The modem reliance on foster care may be explained in part by the
fact that a child's stay in foster care in theory is only a temporary
stopover until the child can be reunited with his or her own parents.144
All the available evidence suggests that short term foster care is the
exception rather than the rule, but the myth of short term care is
pervasive, and most foster care programs are administered as if all of
the children eventually will return home. 45
139. See generally Eisenberg, Child Psychiatry: The Past Quarter Century, 39
Am. J. ORTHOPSYcHIATRY 389 (1969).
140. See S. PROVENCE & R.-LnroN, INFANTS IN INSTITUTIONS (1962). The authors
discuss the effect that institutional care has on the motor behavior, reactions to people,
language development, and discovery of body and sense of self. Id. at 65-68, 81-84,
91-94, 100-04, 118-21.
141. The percentage of dependent children receiving specified types of care away
from home during this century breaks down as follows:
Dec. 31, Feb. 1, July 1, Mar. 31,
1910 1923 1930 1971
In institutions 77 66 58 21
In foster homes 15 30 39 76
Awaiting placement 2 3 - -
Elsewhere 6 1 3 3
2 CHILDREN AND Youri, supra note 69, at 398; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AN WELFARE, supra note 8, at table 6.
142. See Low, Foster Care of Children: Major Trends and Prospects, 4 WELFARE
REviEw 12, 13 (Oct. 1966) (79,400 children were in institutions in 1965; estimated
61,900 in 1975).
143: See notes 151-52 infra and accompanying text.
144. See R. GEISER, THE ILLUSION OF CAInr, 81 (1973).
145. In the District of Columbia, for example, the average stay in foster care is
seven years. M. BuRT, supra note 2, at 33. A 1973 study revealed that of 5,481
children in foster care in Iowa, 3,013 had been there for over two years, and 1,981
for over four. Schott, Iowa Assesses Its Foster Care Program, 1 Soc. & REHAn.
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Perhaps the high water mark of this philosophy occurred in the case
of In re Jewish Child Care Association.4 ' Laura Newberger, age five
and a half, had lived almost four and a half years with her foster
parents, the Sanders, who were under contract with the Jewish Child
Care Association of New York. When the Sanders attempted to adopt
Laura the agency decided that she should be removed from their
care, even though the natural mother had not asked that Laura be
returned, and the evidence indicated she was unable to assume respon-
sibility for Laura's care or education. 47 The New York Court of Ap-
peals sustained the agency's action. Although claiming that it was
acting in the best interest of the child,14 8 the court disclosed its pre-
dominant motivation when it observed that "[w]hat is essentially at
stake here in the parental custodial right." 149
The emphasis on the right of parents to repossess their children can
have a negative impact on the children in foster care, for they know
that their biological parents cannot or will not care for them and
that no others consider the children really their own. In addition,
the longer a child stays in foster care the greater is the probability
REcoRD 9 (1974). In a ten year study of children in foster care in nine counties
across the nation, Henry Maas found that 31 percent of the children were in foster
care for ten or more years, 52 percent spent six years or longer in foster care, and
only 24 percent left foster care in less than three years. Maas, Children in Long Term
Foster Care, 43 CHMD WELFA E 321, 323 (1969).
146. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959).
147. Id. at 226-27, 156 N.E.2d at 701-02, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 67-68.
148. Id. at 229, 156 N.E.2d at 703, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 70. The court explained its
actions:
That the Sanders have given Laura a good home and have shown her
great love does not stamp as an abuse of discretion the Trial Justice's
determination to take her from them. Indeed, it is the extreme of
love, affection, and possessiveness manifested by the Sanders, together
with the conduct which their emotional involvement impelled, that
supplies the foundation of reasonableness and correctness of his deter-
mination.
Id.
149. Id. In a rare holding, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia recognized
the needs of a foster child for continuity. See In re N.M.S., No. J-51-806 (D.C. Super.
Ct., Jan. 17, 1974). Judge Murphy in that case allowed a nine and a half year old
child who had lived all but the first eight days of her life with her foster parents to
remain with them despite the agency's request to return the child to her natural mother.
The court explained:
• ..the best interest of this child would not be served by removing her
from this warm and happy home she has known all her life, from her
foster parents whom she calls "Mommy and Daddy", from her four foster
brothers and sisters, to place her in an environment where she feels un-
comfortable and anxious, to live in a place she does not want to live and
with a woman more an acquaintance than a mother. In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court is not finding Ms. P. is an unfit mother in a material sense,
nor is it finding that the [foster parents] are more fit than Ms. P. The
Court is considering the best interests of [the child] and [the child] only.
Id. at 20.
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that the child will be displaced again, which may further impair the
child's already fragile sense of self-worth. A 1963 study found that 28
percent of the children in foster care had been moved three or more
times,"O and a later study revealed that the average number of place-
ments for all children in foster care studied was 2.7.151 Not surpris-
ingly, studies indicate that the longer children remain in foster care,
the more prone they are to display signs of emotional disturbances.15 2
The dangers of constant disruptions of care are well documented.1 53
Consequently, it is difficult to understand the failure of agencies that
care for children to implement their espoused belief in the beneficial
effects of continuous family care. In the nineteenth century, institu-
tions were known to be bad places for children, yet they multiplied.
Today the drawbacks of long term foster care and multiple place-
ments have been documented repeatedly, yet they continue. This
discouraging pattern of discrepancy between theory and practice in
child care placements is so pervasive that the cause must be inherent
in the system.'54 Perhaps, like an early Cruelty worker, the modern
social worker who removes a child from home subconsciously is in-
capable of later placing the child permanently in someone else's care."
3. The Influence of Public Funding. Undoubtedly, institu-
tional as well as individual pressures operate to maintain children in
foster homes. In New York in 1969, for example, of the $4200 annual
state allotment for each foster child, only $1800 went to the foster
parents. The adoption agencies retained the remaining $2400 for
clothing and medical expenses."' That the agencies could pocket the
difference if the $2400 exceeded actual expenses provided agencies
with a clear incentive to keep children in foster care rather than to
150. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CHILDREN, PROBLEMS AND
SERVICES IN CHILD WELFARIE PROGRAMS 81 (1963).
151. Bryce & Ehlert, 144 Foster Children, 50 CHILD WELFARE 499, 502 (1971).
152. See R. GEISER, supra note 144, at 57-80; Jaffe, Effects of Institutionalization on
Adolescent, Dependent Children, 48 CHILD WELFARE 64, 70-71, 111 (1969) (Israeli
study). Geiser discusses the impact foster care has on a child's self-confidence, sense
of self-worth, and self-identity. See R. GEISER, supra.
153. See note 9 supra.
154. In a 1973 study, juvenile court judges listed the inadequacy of preliminary and
foster care placement facilities as their major problem. See Smith, A Profile of juvenile
Court Judges in the United States, 25 JUVENILE JUSTICE 27, 34-36 (1974).
155. Bowlby has labeled the glamour of saving neglected children the "rescue fan-
tasy," and has warned "[o]nly if the caseworker is mature enough and trained enough
to respect even bad parents and to balance the less-evident long-term considerations
against the manifest and perhaps urgent short term ones, will she help the parents
themselves and do a good turn to the child." J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE
GROWTH OF LOVE 136 (Penguin ed. 1953).
156. See Gordon, Terminal Placements of Children and Permanent Termination of
Parental Rights: The New York Permanent Neglect Statute, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
215, 256 n.206 (1971).
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return them to their natural parents or to place them with a new
adoptive family.5 7
Such a practice not only contravenes the best interests of the child
and the findings of social science, but it is also fiscally unsound. Judge
Justine Poller vividly described the public funding policies that have
discouraged keeping children and their natural parents together at
high cost to the taxpayers:
[Mlothers in the aid to families with dependent children (AFDC)
program receive on the average less than $1 a day for each child.
If we find the home is inadequate, that the mother is unable to
cope with the problems of so many children, we remove the child
to the home of a stranger or a series of strangers, paying from
public funds up to $7 a day for the child's care. If the child is
removed to an institution, the institution is paid up to $14 a day.
Finally, if the child becomes emotionally disturbed, payments
from public funds may range from $10 to $25 a day. Thus, the
further the child is removed from his family, the more we are
ready to pay for his support. 55
A recent study estimated that in New York it costs the state $122,500
to rear a child to age 18 in foster care, compared to a projected cost
of $25,560 for rearing that same child as part of a normal family.'59
The funds that the state spends on foster care clearly could finance
considerable special services for families with abuse or neglect prob-
lems.
Until recently, funding policies also have encouraged long term
stays in foster homes because they made it more lucrative for families
to provide foster care rather than to adopt the children. Currently,
however, subsidized adoption programs in a growing number of states
allow social agencies to make financial payments to adoptive parents
after the legal consummation of the adoption and thereby eliminate
one financial barrier that prevented many parents from adopting. 6°
157. See id. at 256.
158. Polier, The Invisible Legal Rights of the Poor, 12 CHMDREN 215, 218 (1965).
159. D. FANSHEL & E. SHNN, DOLLARS AND SENSE IN THE FosTER CARE oF
CHILDREN: A LooK AT COST FACToRs 20-21 (1972).
160. See Gentile, Subsidized Adoption in New York: How Law Works-and Some
Problems, 49 CmLD WELFARE 576 (1970), reprinted in 3 CHMDREN AND YouTH, supra
note 69, at 781; Goldberg & Linde, The Case for Subsidized Adoptions, 48 CHILD
WELFARE 96 (1969); Wheeler, The Use of Adoptive Subsidies, 48 CaILD WELFARE
557 (1969).
The Child Welfare League reported that 31 states and the District of Columbia had
enacted subsidy legislation by March 1, 1974. CWLA Information Source Memoran-
dum No. 11574 (March 1974). The states are California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
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Three basic types of subsidy are offered: those for specific services
such as medical care, legal services, or special education;"" time-
limited subsidies to mitigate the immediate costs of acquiring a new
member of the family;16 2 and long term subsidies paid periodically
until the child reaches majority.163 By paying adoption subsidies at
rates less than the foster care fee, states preclude adoption of children
for money while they assist foster families or low-income families who
are financially unable to shoulder the full cost of adoption. 0 4
4. Legal Barriers. The law has exacerbated the difficulty of
devising more constructive neglect interventions and dispositions be-
cause the factfinding is separated from the disposition stage of the
neglect process. 6 5 Undoubtedly based in part on the criminal process
model, which separates trial and sentencing in an effort to make the
determination of criminal guilt as objective as possible, the division
of the neglect process unfortunately has sometimes precluded the judi-
ciary from fulfilling its parens patriae role, since a determination of
whether intervention in a family would be in the best interests of a
child often requires consideration of the alternatives available for the
child. The split of factfinding and disposition debisions furthermore
has encouraged an unfortunate focus on the child after removal is
ordered, when follow-up progress reports are made to the courts. A
simple request for information on the agency's progress toward the
reunion of the child and family might do much to encourage agencies
to fulfill this often overlooked responsibility. 66
161. See CAL. WELF. & INSe'NS CODE § 16117 (Supp. 1970) (aid to children limited
to those designated "hard-to-place").
162. See N.Y. Soc. SErv. LAw § 398(k) (McKinney Supp. 1969) (authorizing such
payments as are necessary for the welfare of the child).
163. See MD. ARN. CODE, art. 16, § 67 (1973); MAIIYLAND DEP'T OF SocIA. SEnVICES,
Gum.ELI-ES FOR SumSmnEm ADOPTION VI (1969).
164. In 1971 between 60,000 and 190,000 children were in need of adoption in the
United States. Morgenstein, The New Face of Adoption, NEwswVVE, Sept. 13, 1971,
at 66. The Child Welfare League that year estimated that as many as 80,000 non-
white children were in need of adoption. Id. Nonwhite adoptions have always lagged
behind white adoptions; in 1969, for example, of 171,000 legal adoptions, only 19,000
involved minority children. Id. Studies have shown that money is the primary factor
deterring black families from adopting. See Herzog & Bernstein, Why So Few Negro
Adoptions?, 12 CHILDBEN 14, 16-17 (1965). Subsidized adoption programs, therefore,
should facilitate the adoption of minority children by families of their own color. In
New York from September .1968 to March 1970, the majority of the 92 approved
subsidies went to blacks, and 17 of 21 legally finalized adoptions involved black families,
while 3 involved Puerto Rican families. Gentile, supra note 160, at 782.
165. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANs. §§ 16-23, -2316, -2317, -2319, -2320 (1973); ILL.
ANN. STATS. ch. 37, § 702-1, 704-8, 705-1 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Fnm..y CT. ACT §§ 1044,
1045, 1047 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
166. Bryce and Ehlert found that casework services were being provided to less than
half the natural parents of children who were supposed to be returned to their natural
parents. Bryce & Ehlert, supra note 151, at 502. Henry found that 73 percent of the
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Courts could use programs that have successfully reunited neglected
or abused children with their families as models for dispositions that
would require more than simple removal of the child and would avoid
leaving the burden of rehabilitation solely on the family. For several
years, Doctors Henry Kempe and Ray Heifer have operated a clinic
for families with child abuse and neglect problems.'67 Through the
use of lay therapists, parents anonymous groups, crises nurseries, and
therapeutic day care centers, they have been able to reunite children
with their parents in a phenomenal 90 percent of the cases.'16 Recent
developments in the use of family therapy 6 9 also suggest that success
can be achieved in many more situations of family pathology than
was previously imagined possible.
III. CURRENT NEGLECT STANDARDS AND PRACTICE
A. PRINCIPLES OF REVIEW
The preceding survey of past neglect practice demonstrates the
basis of the current conceptual dilemma: jurisdiction to protect chil-
dren from physical and emotional harm was only recently embroid-
ered on a statutory framework originally established to provide work
or training for poor children and to minimize welfare costs and fraud.
Only with the development of aid to dependent children and the new
awareness of the special needs of children did the neglect process
cease being primarily a welfare program and become instead the chief
public arbiter of acceptable parental behavior. The survey also pre-
sents a rather discouraging history of practices under which children
are removed from their families only to languish in institutions or in
parents of children in long term foster care were receiving little or no agency treat-
ment. Maas, supra note 145, at 331.
Some juvenile courts undoubtedly have hesitated to pressure the child welfare
agencies because they are uncertain whether they have power to act. Compare Denver
v. Juvenile Court, 511 P.2d 898, 901-02 (Colo. 1973) (court has jurisdiction to order
Department of Welfare to place a child in need of supervision in a group facility)
with State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't. v. Richardson, 13 Ore. App. 259, 262, 508 P.2d
476, 477 (1973) (court can recommend visitation with parents to Children's Service
Division, but cannot compel Division to take particular action); cf. State ex rel.
Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99, 101-02 (Mo. 1970) (juvenile court has
inherent authority to do all that is necessary to assure the administration of justice).
167. See Hearings on Child Abuse Prevention Act, 1973, Before the Subcomm. on
Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. at 167 (1973) (statement of C. Henry Kempe, Director, National Center for
Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect); Fraser, supra note 28, at 122-24.
168. See Hearings, supra note 167, at 167, 193.
169. See generally, N. ACKERMAN, THE PSYCHODYNAMIcS OF FAIN.IY LIFE (1958);
EXPANDING THEORY AND PRACTICE IN FAMILY THERAPY (Ackerman ed. 1967); A.
FERBER, M. MENDELSHON, & A. NAPiER, THE BOOK OF FAMILY THERAPY (1972); S.
WHITE, 2 FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR YOUNG CHILDREN: REvIEV AND RECOMMENDATIONS
238-87 (1973); Bowen, The Use of Family Theory in Clinical Practice, 7 CoNTRE-
HENsIVE PsYcHIATny 345, 364-73 (1966).
19751
TmE GEORGETOWN LAW JOuRNAL
a series of temporary foster homes. Current social science evidence
suggests that the separation of children from their parents can be
harmful to the emotional development of the children, whatever the
faults of the parents.170  Legislatures, agencies, and courts therefore
must exercise caution at three critical stages in the neglect process:
the authorization of standards for state intervention to protect chil-
dren, the application of standards to individual families, and the design
of dispositions for the families and their children. In general, family
ties ought to be enhanced, not only because parents have legal claims
to their children, but also because history and social science indicate
that the enhancement of family ties is normally the best way to pro-
tect the best interests of the children.' 7 '
The following principles embody an approach balancing the inter-
ests of child, parent, and state at the three critical stages:
1. Standards for court intervention in a family should focus
on the emotional and physical needs of the children rather than
on parental fault.
2. Decisions on whether and how to intervene in a family should
serve to enhance the social and emotional bonds Qf that family.
3. Courts should require a permanent placement for any child
who has been removed from his family and who cannot be re-
turned safely within a period of time that is reasonable in view
of the age and needs of the child.
The focus of principle one on the needs of children rather than on
parental fault 172 should enhance family autonomy' by reducing the
170. See note 9, supra.
171. S. WrrrE, 3 FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR YOUNG CHILDREN: REVIEW AND
RECOM2 MNDATIONS 86-87 (1973). Predictions about future relations in any family or
about the development of any child are uncertain at best. Even Anna Freud, an
ardent defender of the emotional needs of children, warned that in spite of advances,
"there remain a number of factors which make clinical foresight, i.e., prediction [of
the development of a child] difficult and hazardous." Freud, Child Observation and
Prediction of Development-A Memorial Lecture in Honor of Ernst Kris, reprinted in
J. GOLDSTEn & J. KArz, supra note 16, at 953-54.
172. Judge Gill of Connecticut has long argued for a focus on the needs of each
child:
The neglect statutes are concerned with parental behavior not as behavior
per se, but only and solely as it adversely affects the child in those areas
of the child's life about which the statutes have expressed concern. Each
child embodies his own unique combination of physical, psychological,
and social components; no child has quite the same strengths or weak-
nesses as another or exactly the same relationship with his family. The
parental failure which markedly damages one child might leave another
quite untouched. This interaction between the child and his family is the
essence of a neglect situation, the imponderable which defies statutory con-
straint.
Gill, The Legal Nature of Neglect, 6 NAT. PAROLE & PROBATION Ass'N. J. 1, 5 (1960);
accord, Cheney, Safeguarding Legal Rights in Providing Protective Services, 13 CHMDIEN
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number of families brought to court.173  Parental misconduct should
justify state intervention only if it has a negative impact on the chil-
dren. Similarly, principle one should help to avert application of the
intervention process to families who have only dirty houses 174 or
unconventional life styles because it will focus the decisionmakers,
at each stage of the process, on the children rather than on the be-
havior of the parents or the physical nature of the home environ-
ment.17
5
In keeping with the modem judicial and scientific recognition of the
importance of early emotional development, principle one also author-
izes intervention to protect children from emotional injury. But when
read in conjunction with principle two, the interventionist potential
of principle one is tempered by a strong prejudice against intervention.
The application of parens patriae power traditionally has involved a
balancing process that takes into account the unique characteristics
of a particular family and child, as well as predictions about the bene-
fits and costs of intervention. The second principle of enhancement
of family bonds is intended to weight the balance against intervention
or, if intervention is necessary, to promote the least disruptive form
of intervention. For example, unless it is probable rather than merely
possible that a parent will again beat a child, and that adequate
86, 90 (1966). Cheney argued that "a protective statute should exclude the right to
intervene in family life because of the parent's behavior unless there is some direct evi-
dence that it is adversely affecting the child." Id. at 90; cf. In re Larry and Scott H.,
192 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1963) (children cannot be removed from mentally in-
competent mother in absence of proof that they lacked proper care because of her mental
incapacity).
173. See M. Rein, Child Protective Services in Massachusetts, An Analysis of the
Network of Community Agencies 36 (1963) (unpublished paper prepared for the
Florence Heller Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare of Brandeis
University). Martin Rein found that 60 percent of a random sample of cases in
which public intervention was undertaken in 1960 involved parental misconduct in
the form of marital conflict, overt fighting between the parents, immorality in the
home, excessive drinking, or excessive profanity. Rein concluded that "only between
5 and 15 percent of the [public child protective service agency cases] reflect condi-
tions of extreme neglect or abuse . . . . The majority ...reflect what might be
termed an unwholesome home atmosphere, under which heading might be included
situations ranging from parental immorality through general bad housekeeping. These
are conditions which may well be detrimental to the well-being of the child, but
which are not what is commonly understood as neglect or abuse." Id. at 139.
174. But see In re Gibson, No. 40391 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 1973). The Gibson
court upheld the removal of four children from their parents on the ground that their
house was "very filthy," despite testimony that the children were happy, in good
health, and not dirtier than ordinary children. The court specifically held that the
government did not have to prove that the home conditions had resulted in disease
of mind or body in order to establish neglect. Id. at 3-5.
175. Recent opinions have recognized the danger that the neglect process can be
directed against bad housekeepers or those having unconventional life styles. See
State v. McMaster, 486 P.2d 567, 572-73 (Ore. 1971) (fact that child's home sur-
roundings did not maximize her potential insufficient to enable a court to sever
parental rights).
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protection other than removal cannot be devised, principle two en-
courages the court to provide a homemaker or lay therapist to the
family rather than to remove the child. Where removal is necessary
because it is the only reasonable way to protect the physical well-being
of the child, the second principle dictates that aid continue to go to
the family and reasonable efforts be made to reunite the child and
family.
The third principle carries the goal of enhancement of family bonds
one step further. Where events over a reasonable period of time con-
firm a judgment that enhancement of the original family ties is not
possible, a new permanent placement should be arranged. For older
children, this new placement might be with a small group home or
a permanent foster family, rather than with the more traditional nu-
clear adoptive family.176  In any case, the child's new home should
be selected as a permanent family environment for that child, not a
temporary one subject to disruption because of travel, divorce, or
death.
B. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT STANDARDS AND DISPOSITIONS
1. Standards. Few neglect decisions are ever appealed, per-
haps because until recently few states provided counsel to parents
involved in these proceedings. 77 The appeals that are taken rarely
result in reversals because appellate courts generally sustain trial court
decisions absent a clear abuse of discretion. 78 As a result, the lan-
guage of neglect statutes rather than of judicial decisions remains the
primary source of law in this area. 79  Four categories of statutory
grounds for taking children from their parents currently are in force
in the United States: abandonment 1 80 and voluntary relinquishment;
physical abuse; technical neglect; and general neglect.
176. See Andrews, When is Subsidized Adoption Preferable to Long-term Foster
Care?, 50 CHmD WELFARE 194, 198-99 (1971); Andrews, Permanent Placement of
Negro Children through Quasi-Adoption, 47 Csm= WELFAmE 583 (1968).
177. One study in New York found that where the parents did not have counsel,
only 7.9 percent of the neglect petitions brought to court were dismissed, and 79.5
percent resulted in a finding of neglect. Of the cases in which the parents were
represented by counsel, 25 percent were dismissed and only 62.5 percent resulted
in a finding of neglect. Note, Representation in Child Neglect Cases: Are Parents
Neglected?, 4 COLUm. LAw & Soc. PROB. 230, 241 (1968).
178. See In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 228, 156 N.E.2d 700, 703,
183. N.Y.S.2d 65, 69 (1959); note 146 supra and accompanying text.
179. Unfortunately, many lawyers and judges ignore the importance of the statutes
when they cite authority from other jurisdictions. Cases from other states frequently
are cited even when the neglect statutes of the other states differ substantially from
the statute of the citing jurisdiction.
180. Several states that do not list abandonment specifically as a basis for a neglect
finding have other provisions apparently broad enough to cover abandonment situations.
See, e.g., CALiF. WELF. & INsT'Ns CoDE § 600 (a), (b) (West 1972) ("has no
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Abandonment and Voluntary Relinquishment. Of the four
statutory categories, abandonment and voluntary relinquishment pro-
ceedings raise the fewest conceptual issues since, by definition, there
is no parental interest to be weighed in the balance. In practice,
however, the authorities must attempt to locate the parents. Locating
the parents can be difficult, and may be complicated by Stanley v.
Illinois,8' which suggests that notice of pending neglect actions in
some cases must be given to the natural father of the child even if
the parents never married and the father never officially acknowledged
the child as his. 82
A more difficult issue is presented when parents are known but are
unwilling to provide complete care for their child. To deal with this
problem, most states have provided that after a specified time partial
abandonment creates a presumption of intent to abandon that is suf-
ficient to justify a neglect finding.183 A better procedure to follow,
consistent with principle two, would involve working with the family
to make reunion possible before as well as after the child is declared
neglected.
Provisions which specify that children are legally neglected when
voluntarily relinquished by their parents184 seem intended primarily
to formalize a procedure that has taken place informally for years
without any regular judicial involvement. In many areas of the
country, as many as fifty percent of the children in the custody of
parent or guardian," "destitute," "not provided with a home or suitable place of
abode"); Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.011 (4) (Supp. 1972) ("under such improper parental
care and control or guardianship"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3792 (Supp.
1974) ("child in need of protective custody"); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 24
(Supp. 1974) ("who lacks proper attention of parent, guardian . . . , or custodian");
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-5 (h) (1972) ("who, for any reason . . . lacks the care
necessary for his health"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.101 (1) (1962) ("has no
home, ... guardianship, or any visible means of subsistence").
181. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
182. Id. at 658. In Stanley, however, the location of the natural father was known,
and he had been living with the children. Id. at 646. Current agency interpreta-
tions of the Stanley doctrine, therefore, are based on a broad reading of the decision,
and may be unwarranted in light of the facts.
183. See D.C. SUPE. CT. RuxLE 16(b)(2). This neglect rule provides: "Where the
petition alleges abandonment of a child ...the following evidence shall be sufficient
to justify an inference of neglect: ...the child's parents, guardian or custodian are
known but have abandoned the child in that they have made no effort to maintain
a parental relationship with the child for a period of not less than 6 months." Id.
Abandonment should not be found, for example, when the failure to maintain a
parental relationship resulted from public regulations that made it difficult if not im-
possible for parents to arrange visits with their children who were temporarily placed
in foster homes. See C.S. v. Smith, 483 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. App. 1972).
184. Several cases have challenged agency procedures that make a parent's voluntary
relinquishment of a child irrevocable, though adoption has not yet occurred. Perhaps
the most famous recent challenge concerned the relinquishment of "Baby Lenore." See
Foster, Adoption and Child Custody, 22 BurF. L. REv. 1, 7-14 (1972).
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public or private agencies have been voluntarily relinquished by
their parents, either temporarily or permanently, without a hearing or
judicial review of any sort.'85 Judicial review of these relinquish-
ments would ensure that the parents have been fully informed of their
rights and have not been coerced into relinquishment by threats of
financial or legal retribution.8 6
Physical Abuse. Physical abuse provisions, unlike the
abandonment provisions, suffer from several serious conceptual prob-
lems. First, the issue of where to draw the line between acceptable
parental discipline and abuse must be faced. The parent or parents
may admit causing the injury that triggered the court appearance
but will object to state intervention on the ground that the action was
a reasonable exercise of their power to discipline the child. Different
philosophies of proper child discipline may clash in this situation.
Some commentators have suggested that juries or similar citizens
groups might offset class or cultural bias in these cases,187 but off-
setting class or cultural bias is needed only if parental fault and the
185. Conversation with Sherill Rudy, Court Liaison of the Social Rehabilitation
Administration of the Dep't of Human Resources for the District of Columbia, in
Washington, D.C., April 16, 1974. See also CALuroNm STATE SocL& WEL rA E
BOARm, REPORT ON FosTR CAnE, CHMLDREN WAIrING (1972), cited in Mnookin,
supra note 2, at 601 & n.4 (estimate of 50 percent for California); Polier & McDonald,
The Family Court in an Urban Setting, in HELPING Tm BATTERED CHILD AND HIS
FAm.y 215 (1972) (similar figure for New York City).
186. The hearing could be modeled on the procedures applicable when a person
charged with a crime makes a guilty plea. The protections would outweigh the
emotional strain of the proceeding to the parent giving up his child. In addition,
the hearing would alert the court to the fact that the childis in public custody and
thereby increase the chance of future judicial supervision of what the agency does
with the child.
187. Rodham recommends entrusting the evaluation of a child's needs and the
intervention determinations to the discretion of boards representative of the family's
community:
Boards composed of citizens representing identifiable constituencies-
racial, religious, ethnic, geographical-could make the initial decision
regarding intervention or review judicial decisions. Additionally, they
should be responsible for periodically reviewing placements and making
recommendations about terminating parental rights. The board mem-
bership should include parent and professional representatives, per-
haps children as well. Decisions to intervene and to terminate parental
rights should require a three-fourths vote to overcome the presumption
agt int ervention. Memberhip might be elected and should rotate
often to avoid institutional classification.
Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. EDuc. REv. 487, 514 (1973). Citizens'
boards have been used in Scandinavia for some time. Specialists in child development
in Denmark revealed that under their system, which relies almost totally on negotia-
tion and never on coercion, the boards almost never remove children from their homes,
even when they should, because the boards fear that removal will undermine the
future negotiating power of the board. Conversations with Vidil Peterson, Danish
Social Research Institute in Copenhagen, June 12, 1973 and with Ib Ydebo, Kontorchef
of Copenhagen, June 13, 1973. Ultimately there may be something useful about the
American system that interposes the court as the decision maker with coercive powers.
922
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presence or absence of religious or philosophic justifications for the
parental action constitute the bases for decisions. Principle one sug-
gests that the decision to take jurisdiction should be based on whether
the child is seriously injured physically or emotionally, and not on
the blameworthiness of the parent.""'
The abuse area poses a second problem-the need for a standard
that will allow intervention when there are no witnesses to a child
beating and the child is unable or unwilling to testify against the
parent. To meet this problem many jurisdictions have drafted stand-
ards based on the tort principle of res ipsa loquitur.'89 While the
application of a res ipsa standard probably is justified when a court
is deciding whether it should assume jurisdiction, a court should not
use res ipsa to determine the nature of intervention. The fact that a
parent beat his child once does not necessarily mean he will do so
again. Unless a repetition of the beating is probable, 190 a court
should not automatically remove the child from home. Other less
drastic protective measures, such as homemaker services or child
protective services, may suffice."'
188. Bronfenbrenner in 1958 reported "Ein matters of discipline, working class
parents are consistently more likely to employ physical punishment, while middle-
class families rely more on reasoning, isolation, appeals to guilt and other methods
involving the threat of less love." Bronfenbrenner, Socialization and Social Class
Through Time and Space in RAmnS IN SOCLAL PSYCHOLOGY (E. Maccoby, T. New-
comb, & E. Hartley eds. 1958). A later study did not show this difference, however.
See Kohn, Social Class and Parent-Child Relationships, 68 AW. J. OF Soc. 471 (1963).
Efforts to compensate for imagined class differences may result in inadequate pro-
tection for certain children. See Dumpson v. Daniel M., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 6, 1974, at
1 (parental discipline believed appropriate in Nigeria was nonetheless held excessive
corporal punishment in New York).
189. See IDaHo CODE § 16-1625(m) (Supp. 1974). Idaho defines an abused
child as one who:
exhibits evidence of skin bruising, bleeding, malnutrition, sexual molesta-
tion, lumps, burns, fractures of any bone, subdural hematomas, soft tissue
swelling, failure to thrive or death, and such condition or death is not
justifiably explained, or where the history given concerning such condition
or death is at variance with the degree or type of such condition or death,
or the circumstances indicate that such condition or death may not be the
product of an accidental occurrence.Id.
190. Expert psychiatric testimony seems appropriate to the determination of whether
repetition is probable. Cf. Gill, supra note 172, at 12. Gill believed that "[n]o child
should be found to be emotionally neglected without a psychiatric or psychological
evaluation of his emotional condition." Id.
191. The application of res ipsa to find emotional neglect is even less valid. No pre-
sumption of emotional neglect can be drawn from proof of physical conditions. Three
specialists in child development recently warned that "the problem is that some workers
in the child care services have learned the lesson of environmental influence too well.
Consequently, they view the child as a mere adjunct to the adult world, a passive
recipient of parental impact. They tend to ignore that children interact with the
environment on the basis of their individual innate characteristics. It is this interaction,
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Technical Neglect. There are four types of technical
neglect provisions, which predicate a neglect finding not on any
proof of physical or emotional injury to the child, but on legal trans-
gressions that are at best tangentially related to the condition of the
child. In one type of provision, many states provide that a child who
has been placed in unlicensed facilities may be declared neglected.1 02
Such provisions clearly are designed more to enforce state adoption
or licensing statutes than to meet the needs of children. The con-
ceptual clarity of the neglect statutes would be increased if more
direct enforcement that did not burden the neglect process were
provided.
A second type of technical neglect provision, currently in force in
nine states, applies to children who require special medical or educa-
tional services because of physical or mental disability. "3 Like the
first type of technical neglect provision, this type apparently is a
tool for the effectuation of another policy-aid to handicapped chil-
dren. Again, the provision of direct relief would be preferable be-
cause it would reduce confusion in the neglect area, and would avoid
the forcible removal of children and the attachment of stigma to the
family where only financial aid instead of separation is needed.
not mere response, which accounts for the countless variations in character and per-
sonality." J. GOLDSTEiN, A. FnEuD, & A. SOLNrT, supra note 9, at 10-11.
Even in physical abuse cases, the res ipsa doctrine has been confused with the so-
called battered child syndrome. Some lawyers and judges have come to view the syn-
drome as a tangible disease. One judge reportedly refused to find two injured siblings
to be abused because he knew that a parent with the battered child syndrome beats
only one child at a time. See generally Gelles, Child Abuse as Psychopathology, 43
Am . J. ORTHopsYcmATRY 611 (1973) (critique of child abuse syndrome).
192. Some of the states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, and Kansas. See note 5 supra (statutory citations).
193. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(9) (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53.
(Supp. 1974); IowA CODE § 232.2(14) (b) (1971); MiNN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 10(d)
(Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-5(h) (1972); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-201(3)(d)
(1974); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2151.03(D) (Page Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1101(d) (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. §48.13(1)(e) (1957). Alaska, for
example, authorizes the judiciary to declare any child who "is in need of special care
or training" neglected. ALASKA STAT. §47.10.010(9) (1971); Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1974) (a deprived child is one "whose home is a suitable one for
him save for the financial inability of his parent or guardian or other person maintaining
such home, to provide the specialized care his condition requires."). Minnesota's pro-
vision differs from Alaska's in that it requires a showing that the parent has "neglected"
or "refused" to provide the special care made necessary by the physical or mental con-
dition of the child. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 10(d) (Supp. 1974). The Minnesota
provision, therefore, actually is a special example of the general neglect provisions which
require "proper" parental care. The fact that the legislature listed this provision sep-
arately illustrates the extent to which many neglect statutes focus more on parental fault
than the needs of the child. If the focus were on the child, by contrast, proper parental
care presumably would be measured in terms of the special needs of children, so that
a separate provision like that of Minnesota would be redundant.
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A third variety of technical neglect provisions applies to children
who commit delinquent or unruly acts.' Declaring such children
neglected rather than delinquent or unruly may subject them to less
punitive treatment, but this label change may not be in the best
interests of children who are truly neglected; one consequence may
be a commingling of neglected children with delinquents. This com-
mingling not only may harm the neglected children directly but also
may result in the spread of the stigma that attaches to delinquent
children to neglected children. This stigma, in turn, may lead to
harsher treatment of all neglected children by police, social workers
or judges. Similarly, unruly child statutes have been criticized be-
cause state intervention often does not decrease, but rather encourages
delinquent behavior through the exposure of young offenders to
older, more experienced lawbreakers. 9 ' Unruly child statutes have
been criticized on many grounds. The practice of state intervention
designed to correct the deviant behavior of juveniles who have not yet
committed a crime, therefore, must not be allowed to slip in the back
door disguised as a neglect intervention.
A final category of technical neglect provisions relates to the en-
forcement of state child labor provisions.'96 In South Dakota, for
example, playing music on the street was grounds for being declared
neglected until 1968.97 Like the illegal placement provisions, the
child labor neglect provisions should be eliminated, and direct en-
forcement against employers should be instituted. Child labor pro-
visions should not distort the already troubled neglect procedure.
General Neglect. Three types of general neglect pro-
visions deserve special comment: those that authorize intervention
because the family is poor, those that-authorize intervention because
of "immoral" or "depraved" behavior by the parent or child, and those
that focus solely on the "environment" or "surroundings" of the
child. All three types violate principle one, and they may violate
state or federal constitutional standards, 98 yet they remain surpris-
ingly widespread.
194. Delinquent or unruly children are termed persons or children "'in need of super-
vision" in some jurisdictions. See OE. BEv. STAT. § 419.476(f) (1971) (children who
run away from home are considered "in need of supervision"). Truancy often is specified
as the kind of act that qualifies a child for such a label. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§50-102(4)(v) (Supp. 1974).
195. See Note, supra note 130, at 1397-1402.
196. See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (1953); id.
(Supp. 1970).
197. S.D. ComPILED LAws ANN. § 26-8-6(a) (1967), repealed, id. § 26-8-6 (Supp.
1974).
198. See notes 218-29 infra and accompanying text.
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Sixteen states still allow poverty to be an explicit basis for declaring
a child neglected. 9 ' The word poverty is rarely used, however;
"destitution" is the favored phrase.200 A few statutes list begging for
alms as the catalyst for state intervention, as if this were sixteenth
century England.0 1  In addition, fourteen states indirectly author-
ize intervention on the basis of family poverty because they list failure
to provide support, education, or medical care as a basis for a neglect
finding and do not provide that lack of financial means may serve as
a defense to any state intervention or to removal of the child. 2
Sixteen states allow parental "immorality" to trigger a neglect find-
ing. 2  Finally, thirty-one states link an unfit "environment" or "sur-
roundings" to neglect declarations.0 4
199. See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(1), (2) (1958); Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(10)
(b) (1956); Arem STAT. ANN. § 45-203(e) (Supp. 1973); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE§ 600(b) (West 1972); DE. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (1953); id. (Supp. 1970); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.01(10)(b) (Supp. 1974); IND. CODE § 31-5-7-6(2) (1969); MD. CTS.
& JuD. PRocEEDiNGs § 4-501(f) (2) (Supp. 1974) (applies only to Montgomery County);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(3) (Supp. 1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:2(I)
(1955); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(d) (Supp. 1974); ORE. REv. STAT. §§
419.476(1)(d),(e) (1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-3H (Supp. 1974); TEx. FANI-
I.Y CODE § 17.04 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.010(1) (1962); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §49-1-3(1)(3) (1966).
200. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(1) (1958); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201
(10)(b) (Supp. 1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(3) (Supp. 1974); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(d) (Supp. 1974).
201. See, e.g., AiA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(2) (1958).
202. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(19)(e) (Penn. Supp. 1967); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24A-401(h)(1) (Supp. 1973); HAW-Air Rv. STAT. § 571-11(2)(A) (Supp.
1974); IDAHO CODE § 16-1625(1)(1) (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.031(l)(a)
f1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(4) (1969); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(C)
(Page Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(4) (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-1095.9 (1) (Supp. 1973); S.D. CoMPiLED LAws ANN. § 26-8-6 (Supp. 1974);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-202(6)(iv) (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-64(17)
(1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(12) (Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-115.3
(o) (Supp. 1973).
California, Delaware, New Hampshire, and Washigton have explicit poverty grounds
and a necessities provision that does not affirmatively make poverty a defense. See
CAL. WELF. & INSTNS CODE § 600(b) (West 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901
(Supp. 1970); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §169:2(I) (1955); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 13.04.010(1) (1962).
203. See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(2) (1958); ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(10)(b)
(1956); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 600(d) (West 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-53 (Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (1953); id. (Supp. 1970); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.01(10)(f) (Supp. 1974); MD. CTS. & JuD. PROCEEDINGS § 3-801(w) (3)
(Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-5(h) (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:2(I)
(1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(d) (Supp.
1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 419.476(1)(e) (1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-3H
(Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-202(6) (ii) (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. §13.04.010(3),(8) (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. §49-1-4 (1966).
204. See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(2) (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(6) (1971);
Az. REv. STAT. ANN. §8-201(10)(b) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-203(c) (Supp.
1973); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §22-1-3(19)(d) (Pern. Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1974); DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (1953); Id. (Supp.
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A fourth category of general neglect provisions are statutes focusing
on the emotional or physical needs of children. Unfortunately such
provisions often use terms, such as "failure to thrive," that have
technical meanings understood by certain professionals but not by
the average parent or lawyer. °5 Other terms, such as "emotional
health," mean as little to professionals as they mean to lay persons.
Consequently, some commentators and judges have argued that the
neglect process should not extend to emotional dangers, or have tried
to find principles in the law to chart judicial decisions in such cases.2" 6
Courts have not had a very'sophisticated understanding of the needs
of children, however, and have paid little attention to their emotional
needs. 07 Case law therefore is not a fruitful source for guidelines,
1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (1O) (e) (Supp. 1974); HAwAIr REV. STAT. § 571-11(2)
(B) (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 16-1626(c) (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 37,
§702-4(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972); IND. CODE §31-5-7-6(5) (1969); IowA CODE
§232.2(15)(d) (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38 -804 (g)( 3 ) (1973); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. Ut. 22, § 3792 (Supp. 1974); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROCEEDINGS § 3-801 (u) (3) (Supp.
1974); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 24 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. § 260.015,
subd. 10(e) (Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-5(h) (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§211-031(1)(c) (1962); NEB. REV. STAT. §43-201(3)(c) (1974); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 169:2(I) (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-3
(5)(a) (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(4) (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
1095.9(1) (b) (Supp. 1973); S.D. Comxr.aD LAws ANN. § 26-8-6 (Supp. 1974); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-158(1)(f) (Supp. 1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.010(4)
(1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-3(5) (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.13(1)(f)
(1957).
205. See N.Y. FAML.y CT. AcT §§ 1012(e), (f) (McKinney Supp. 1974). See gen-
erally Bullard, Glaser, Meagarty & Pinchek, Failure to Thrive in the "Neglected" Child,
37 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 680 (1967).
206. See Mnookin, supra note 2, at 627-28, 632. In an effort to establish specific
and comprehensible standards for "proper pareptal care," one District of Columbia judge
recently asserted that a child should be found emotionally neglected only if his parents
had failed to supply the necessaries that the law requires parents to supply to their
children. See In re C.S., No. N-0425-72 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 12, 1973) (unpublished
opinion of Stewart, J.). Judge Stewart commented: "This court is impressed by the
reliance of [other jurisdictions] upon a well established specific and precedent laden
body of law for defining the parameters of the phrase 'proper parental care.' Every
jurisdiction has had to confront the question of what are necessaries for which a parent
may be held liable by third persons rendering assistance or credit in good faith." Id.
207. See Mitchel v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (medical
care, food, clothing, lodging are the items for which parent can be held accountable);
In re C.S., No. N-0425-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., July 12, 1973) (same). But see Caruso v.
County of Pima, 2 Ariz. App. 134, 138-9, 406 P.2d 852, 856-57 (1965). The court in
Caruso stated that:
If "proper care" means food and clothing, and these alone, the only con-
ceivable answer to the question before the court is a firm negative, denying
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. We do not, however, believe that
this statute should be so strictly construed .... This court holds that this
body of knowledge is sufficiently well established that a juvenile court, and
this court on appeal, can take judicial notice of the fact that there are
emotional needs of infants the satisfaction of which are equally demanding
as the physical hunger of the child, and that failing to satisfy these needs
may result in more permanent damage.
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and the aid of knowledgeable professionals from related disciplines-
social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, and therapists-should be
sought to identify characteristics that will describe emotional injury
or potential for future injury.28 Their involvement in the process of
developing more precise terms in turn should provide these profes-
sionals with guidance on the law and the factors relevant in neglect
proceedings so they can prepare more useful testimony for the courts
on the issues of whether and how to intervene.
2. Current Intervention Practice. Separation of a child from
his parents is the most common result of a declaration that a child is
neglected.0 9 In most states, statutes authorize other dispositions, but
courts generally avoid these alternatives, either because the fear of the
publicity which might result if a child is returned and injured out-
weighs concern about the drawbacks of removal,210 or because re-
sources to protect the child if removal is not effected are not available.
In addition, when separation is effected, present legal standards often
block permanent placement, the preferred disposition where no suit-
able arrangement in the child's own home can be devised. They block
permanent placement because they require the consent of the natural
parents before a child may be placed for adoption. Unfortunately,
some parents who are unwilling to assume the care of their own chil-
dren also are unwilling to consent to their adoption; other parents
cannot be located.
States have devised three ways to overcome these problems. Thirty
states provide that parental consent can be waived at the adoption
hearing if the child has been abandoned, or if such a waiver appears
to be in the best interests of the child.21' Eleven provide that all
parental rights, including the power to veto adoption, may be ter-
208. See Tamilia, Neglect Proceedings and the Conflict Between Law and Social Work,
9 DuQuESNE L. REV. 579, 586 (1971). Tamilia argued: "Lawyers must become aware
that the psychology of normal and abnormal child development is the only adequate
source of a viable concept of legal neglect that can be sustained in court." Id. at 587.
209. See notes 2, 8 supra and accompanying text.
210. See Burt, supra note 10, at 1274 (discussion of reaction to the murder of three
year old Roxanne Felumero, which occurred after she was returned home by a family
court judge).
211. See ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.040 (1971); Asuz. REV.
STAT. § 8-106(A) (1956); Amx. STAT. ANN. § 45-228 (1956); CAL. CrvrL CODE ch. 4
§ 232 (Supp. 1974); COLO. 1Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4-1, 22-4-7 (Perm. Supp. 1967);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-43a (Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1101-12
(Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-32 (Supp. 1974); HAwAI REv. STAT. § 578-2(b)
(Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 69.1-8 (1973); IND. CODE § 31-3-1-6(g) (1969);
IOWA CODE §§ 232.41-.50 (1969); MD. CODE ANN. art. 16 § 74 (1974); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 3 (Supp. 1974); MrNN. SEss LAws ch. 66, § 259.24, subd. 1
(1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-205(1)(d) (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104
(1974); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 461:3-a (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-26 (Supp.
1973); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (Page Supp. 1974); OKLr.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
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minated at the hearing in which a child is declared to be neglected.212
A third group of states provides for a separate hearing on the issue
of terminating parental rights, which may be called only after a
child has been declared neglected and placed temporarily in the cus-
tody of the state.213
Waiving the requirement of parental consent at the adoption hear-
ing generally is not a very satisfactory approach. Most prospective
adoptive parents are understandably reluctant to proceed as far as
the adoption hearing without a prior guarantee that the child will be
declared eligible for adoption. Moreover, many agencies believe it
best to keep the natural and adoptive parents from meeting so the
parents can preserve their privacy.214 If termination and adoption
occur at the same hearing, a meeting of the parents is usually in-
evitable. Finally, having the prospective adoptive parents at the
hearing on consent may weight the balance against the natural parents
by encouraging the court to use the more lenient best interests test
instead of the parental unfitness test, which is more appropriate in
this context.215
§ 60.6 (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-7-7 (Supp. 1973); S.D. Comn'u.ED
LAws ANN. § 25-6-4 (1967); id. (Supp. 1974); TEax. FAmU.Y CODE § 16.05(d) (1973);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 435 (Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.351 (Supp. 1973);
WAsh. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.110 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.85 (Supp. 1973);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-709 (Supp. 1973).
212. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 47.10.080(c)(3),(d) (1971); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3-12(2)(a) (Perm. Supp. 1967); KAIsz. STAT. ANN. § 38-824(c) (1973); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 3793 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-209 (1974); Osuo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2151.35.3 (Page Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-34 (Supp. 1973);
S.D. CompiIED LAws ANN. § 26-8-55 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 656 (Supp.
1972); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.010 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5 (Supp.
1974).
213. See Amiz. RMv. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11(6)(i)
(Supp. 1974); HAwAI. REv. STAT. § 571-61(a) (Supp. 1974); ID.aro CODE § 16-1638
(Supp. 1974); IND. CODE § 31-3-1-7 (1969); Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.600 (Supp. 1972);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:401- :407 (Supp. 1965); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19
(a) (Supp. 1974); MINN SESS. LAWS ch. 66, § 260.221(b) (1974); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-17-7 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.441 (1962); NEv. REv. STAT. § 128.010.020
(1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4c-15 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-23 (Supp. 1973);
N.Y. FAINv. CT. ACT § 625 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-288 (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1974); OELA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1130-34 (Supp.
1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 312-13 (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-61 (Supp.
1973); TEm. FAm. CODE § 15.02 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-09 (1974); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-178 (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 18.40 (Supp. 1974).
214. See Gordon, supra note 156, at 230.
215. See id. at 229. This article of course takes the position that the traditional
parental unfitness test used in neglect proceedings should be replaced with a standard
that is both more child-focused and designed to enhance family ties when possible.
This proposed standard is not the equivalent of the traditional best interests standard.
The traditional best interests test is appropriate only when a change of custody is in-
evitable, as when a divorce occurs, and the determination must be of which parent is
"best."
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Providing for termination of parental rights at the initial neglect
hearing seems equally unsatisfactory in most cases. Judges are
understandably reluctant to cut off all possibility of reunion of the
child with his natural family at that early stage, since temporary
placement and the provision of supportive and therapeutic services
to the family may alleviate the causes of neglect and abuse. An in-
creasing number of states, therefore, have recognized that the prefer-
able approach is to provide for termination of parental power to
consent to adoption subsequent to the neglect finding but prior to
the adoption hearing.2 6  Unfortunately, not all states use the same
standards to justify a finding of neglect as to terminate parental
rights.217  Consequently, many children are unnecessarily consigned
to spending years in one foster care setting after another.
C. A CONSTITUTIONAL CAVEAT
While this article has critiqued present neglect statutes primarily
in terms of their failure to implement the generally accepted goals
of the neglect process, some of the statutes also may be subject to
constitutional challenge on at least three grounds. First, statutory
provisions that make poverty a basis for state intervention between
parent and child may violate the equal protection clause. In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 218 Justice Powell
stressed two characteristics that a group discriminated against on the
basis of poverty must possess if its classification is to be deemed
suspect: lack of resources must have made the members of the group
unable to pay for some deserved benefit, and they must have sustained
as a consequence an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity
to enjoy that benefit.219 Poverty intervention provisions authorize, at
216. See note 213 supra.. When a child is already living with the prospective adop-
tive parents, however, as when a child has been placed in foster care after a finding
of neglect and the foster parents wish to adopt, the reasons for terminating parental
rights prior to the beginning of the adoption process no longer exist. Indeed, it might
violate the best interests standard to seek a termination in such a case if the foster
parents are not already approved to adopt, since termination will probably cause an
additional change of placement for the child who might othenvise remain with the
foster parents. Yet, in the District of Columbia, the Social Rehabilitation Agency will
not investigate adoptive homes for a child until termination is completed. Conversation
with Wallace Mlyniec, Co-Director, Georgetown Juvenile Justice Clinic, in Washington,
D.C., Feb. 14, 1975.
217. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:401-:407 (1965); ORE. REv. STAT. §§
419.523-.525 (1973); TENN. CODF ANN. § 37-203(a) (2) (Supp. 1974).
218. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
219. Id. at 20. The Court in Rodriquez declined to hold the challenged Texas
school finance statutes unconstitutional because the deprivation was not total even if
the statutes discriminated against the poor. The poor were not being denied schooling
entirely, although their schools might have been less adequate. Id. at 23-24.
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least in cases which end in termination of parental rights, the absolute
loss of children because of family poverty and thus may deprive poor
parents of equal protection of the law. Even if such provisions do
not involve a suspect classification, the parent-child relationship might
be labeled a fundamental interest,220 and the state would be forced
to show a compelling governmental interest for its statutory scheme.
Whether a suspect classification or a fundamental interest is involved,
the statutory provisions could fail the strict scrutiny test. Alterna-
tively, if the renovated rational basis test 221 is applied, judicial scrutiny
may well overturn the legislative decision to equate poverty with
neglect, particularly because a less drastic alternative is available.
222
Second, provisions that focus exclusively on parental characteristics,
whether poverty or immorality, may violate the due process clause
because they establish an irrebuttable presumption that possession of
the characteristic is equivalent to neglect. In Stanley v. Illinois
23
the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute that in effect established
a presumption that all unwed fathers were unfit parents. The Court
in Stanley underscored the importance of parental rights:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the
interest of a parent in the care, custody and management of his
or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements.' [citation omitted]
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the
family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have
been deemed essential.224
The Court acknowledged the power of Illinois to separate neglectful
parents from their children,225 but objected that the presumption
involved in the case might separate fit parents from their children.
The Court added that even if a majority of unwed fathers were in
fact unfit, a presumption that all were unfit was unconstitutional.226
220. See note 20 supra. But see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (fundamental rights are only those guaranteed explicitly or
implicitly by Constitution).
221. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). See generally Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HArv. L. RBv. 1, 21 (1972).
222. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
223. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
224. Id. at 651.
225. Id. at 652.
226. Id. at 656-57. See generally Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 87 HAv. L. Rv. 1534, 1542-43 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Pre-
sumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449, 460 (1975); cf. Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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Similarly, a statute which equates parental immorality and neglect
apparently ignores the determinative issues of competence and care
and therefore has no rational foundation.
Finally, the parental immorality neglect provisions may be unconsti-
tutionally vague. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville 227 the
Supreme Court invalidated a Jacksonville, Florida ordinance which
declared that "rogues, vagabonds, lewd, wanton and lascivious per-
sons [and] persons habitually spending their time by frequenting
houses of ill fame, gaming houses or places where alcoholic beverages
are sold," among others, were vagrants and therefore subject to 90
days imprisonment or a $500 fine or both.2 8  If such labels as "lewd,"
"lascivious" or "wanton" are too vague a standard for the imposition
of a $500 fine, surely they are also too vague a standard for losing
one's children.229
IV. ToWAIW A MODEL NEGLECT STATUTE
The following provisions are presented to illustrate an approach to
the implementation of the three principles developed and discussed
in preceeding sections. The provisions do not constitute a complete
model statute because, for example, they do not cover such procedural
matters as emergency custody procedures, rights to counsel, burdens
of proof, and evidentiary standards. Hopefully, however, they will
encourage and stimulate others to consider solutions that balance
the interests of child, parent, and state in modem neglect proceedings.
Section 1. Definitions.
(A) An "abused" child is one whose parent, guardian, or primary
caretaker inflicts serious physical injuries upon such child; or who
is seriously physically injured while in the care of his parent, guardian,
227. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
228. Id. at 162.
229. But see In re Cager, 251 Md. 473, 481, 248 A.2d 384, 389 (1968); Guardian-
ship of Minor, 298 N.E.2d 890 (Mass. App. 1973) (statute which permits appointment
of guardian if mother is found to be unfit held constitutional); State v. McMaster, 486
P.2d 567, 571 (Ore. 1971); In re Black, 3 Utah 2d 315, 333, 283 P.2d 887, 900
(1955). In Guardianship of Minor the court explained:
The unfit standard has been in our laws since 1873. . . . Through the
process of judicial decision making, the standard has been defined with
as much precision as the subject is capable of. . . . Violence of temper,
indifference or vacillation of feelings toward the child, or inability or in-
disposition to control unparental traits of character or conduct, might con-
stitute unfitness. So, also, incapacity to appreciate and perform the
obligations resting upon parents might render them unfit, apart from
moral defects.
298 N.E.2d at 892-93. While the court was correct in deciding that absolute precision
cannot be achieved in neglect statutes, adherence to principle one would go far to
eliminate vagueness in such statutes.
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or primary caretaker and the explanation provided is at variance
with the type or degree of injury.
(B) A "neglected" child is one whose physical or emotional health is
significantly impaired, or is in danger of being significantly impaired,
as a result of the action or inaction of his parent, guardian, or primary
caretaker.
(C) An "abandoned" child is one whose parents or guardians are
not identifiable, or, if known, have made no reasonable effort to care
for or to arrange adequate substitute care for the child for a period
of six months or more, and who fail to appear at the hearing pro-
vided for in section 3.
Commentary
The definition proposed for neglect is broad enough to cover
emotional as well as physical injury to a child, as long as the injury
is serious. The full parens patriae role of the state thus may be
fulfilled but will not be invoked for trivial injuries. While the abuse
definition logically might be subsumed within the definition of neglect,
a separate label was adopted for abuse in order to make use of the
res ipsa loquitur presumption, applicable in cases of physical injury.
In addition, a separate provision may be needed so that reporting
of abuse may be made mandatory, in order to protect children from
clear physical danger, while the reporting of neglect is made dis-
cretionary because of its more subjective nature. Without such a
distinction police might be overwhelmed with complaints based on
nothing more than philosophic disagreements about how children
should be reared.
In the future it may be possible to provide more descriptive content
to the phrase "emotional health." Professor Michael Wald, for example,
has proposed that intervention be authorized only when emotional
damage is "evidenced by severe anxiety, depression or withdrawal,
or untoward aggressive behavior or hostility towards others." 230 Until
the experts in child behavior reach greater consensus, however, a
general phrase is most appropriate. Expert testimony in court or
legislative hearings should in time provide a suitable list of signs and
symptoms. Until that occurs, legislatures should adopt a statute that
will at least focus the attention of both experts and lay decisionmakers
on the condition of the child rather than on parental fault. Failure
to provide appropriate treatment could constitute inaction within the
meaning of the statute so that in emotional neglect cases intervention
230. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards (manuscript to be published in Stanford Law Journal, April, 1975).
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would be permissible either when parental action demonstrably caused
the emotional problem, or when parents refused to obtain treatment.
Section 2. Intervention Hearing.
A family may be declared "in need of intervention" if any minor
child in the family is found to be "abused" or "neglected," as defined
in section 1, after a full court hearing.
Commentary
The decision to intervene under this section is permissive rather
than mandatory so the court, in keeping with its interest in preserving
family autonomy, may decide against any state intervention even
though a child is abused or neglected. In making its decision, the
court should balance the benefits of available disposition alternatives
against the costs of intervention. If the benefits of homemaker serv-
ices would outweigh costs, for example, but homemaker services were
in fact not presently available, the court should not authorize inter-
vention unless the benefits of some available disposition also would
outweigh costs. Cost assessment should include consideration of
both the financial costs incurred by the state and the stigma or dis-
ruption costs borne by the family. While the judge at this stage
would not need to make a final selection of disposition, family auto-
nomy would be honored if no existing disposition were preferable to
the status quo. This practice would contrast with the present practice
in which a court declares a child neglected without first considering
the available public alternatives.
If intervention is to be undertaken, the label attaches to the family
rather than to the child. This should serve as a reminder to all
participants, including the court and social workers, that the decision
involves an entire family, not just one child. Moreover, if they con-
ceive of an intervention decision as the Jones family case rather than
as In re Johnny Jones, social workers should become more sensitive
and responsive to the entire family system and thereby more likely
to strengthen family bonds where appropriate.
The decision of whether or how to intervene is vested in a judge
rather than in a panel of "experts" because the behavioral sciences
are not developed to the point that an assessment of good parenting
is a technical decision. Judges are free to gather expert advice, of
course, but in the end the decision seems best left in the hands of some-
one who is trained in factfinding rather than of someone who believes
he has special knowledge of the traits of a good parent. The use of
juries might in some communities offset the class or cultural bias of
judges, but in general juries are unlikely to be any more sympathetic
to the child rearing philosophy of families charged with neglect or
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abuse, and they may well be less informed about the range of disposi-
tions. Because a decision to intervene should involve consideration
of the consequences of potential dispositions, the decision on balance
seems best left in the hands of the court.
Section S. Abandonment and Voluntary Relinquishments.
(A) Within thirty days after a child alleged to be abandoned comes
into the custody of the local social service agency, the agency must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the child in fact is
abandoned.
(B) Within thirty days after any child more than one month of
age is voluntarily relinquished to the custody of the agency, the
agency must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the
relinquishment was knowing and voluntary.
Commentary
The one month exception of section (B), included to avoid inter-
fering with existing relinquishment procedures established for pregnant
women who decide to give up their children at birth, is premised on
the theory that a decision not to be a parent from the beginning is
distinguishable from a decision to stop being a parent at a later time.
The reasons against a court appearance may be more compelling in
such cases. For other relinquishments, however, this statute requires
a hearing to confirm that the relinquishment was voluntary rather
than coerced by fear of welfare cutoffs or even by fear of a court
proceeding. Similarly, courts will review abandonment cases to assess
the diligence of efforts to locate missing parents or the extent of the
failure of the parents, if known, to provide care. If the parent, guard-
ian, or primary caretaker appears at the section 3 hearing, however,
a child cannot be declared abandoned, although he might otherwise
fit the standards for a finding of neglect.
Section 4. Dispositions.
(A) When a family is found to be in need of intervention pursuant
to section 2 of this Act, the court shall fashion an order providing to
the family whatever available social services appear necessary to
alleviate the conditions which precipitated the intervention, including,
but not limited to:
(1) day care services;
(2) individual, group or family therapy;
(3) homemaker services; and
(4) counseling designed to inform the family fully about (a)
available services both public and private, (b) how to make
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arrangements to receive them, and (c) the scope of the court
order.
(B) Only if
(1) the services provided iu subsection (A) do not within a
reasonable time adequately reduce the probability of further
neglect or abuse, or
(2) there is no other way to protect the child from the risk of
serious physical injury,
shall the child be placed in the care of a suitable relative, or ff no
suitable relative is available, in foster care. If siblings are removed,
they should be placed together whenever possible.
Commentary
This section is designed to discourage removal of the child when
less intrusive measures might suffice. The provision of counseling
services to explain, among other things, the entire process to the
families might itself serve as a critical first step toward reunion, even
when removal is at least temporarily necessary. Services are to be
provided to the entire family; accordingly, if day care for a younger
sibling of an abused child will lessen family tension enough to reduce
the possibility of future abuse, such care may be provided. If re-
moval is required, both extended family and sibling ties are to be
preserved whenever possible.
Section 5. Planning.
Once services are provided to a family pursuant to section 4(A),
or a child is placed with a relative or in foster care pursuant to section
4(B) or section 3, the social service agency shall within one month
devise a plan, which may be amended when circumstances require,
for helping the family end the abuse or neglect or, in the case of
placement, for reuniting the child with his family.
Commentary
A major objection frequently made to the present procedures for
delivery of social services is their lack of coherence, direction, or
sensitivity to individual situations. This section is intended to
stimulate not only the agency, but the court, to work toward a more
final solution for a neglected child than is provided by endless
renewals of "temporary" placements.
Section 6. Progress Reports.
Every three months a progress report on all relevant members of
the family and the progress being made toward the goals of the section
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5 social service plan as amended shall be submitted to the court by
the social service agency.
Commentary
These reports will keep the court informed, and should remind
the agency to consider the progress that all family members are
making toward the plan goals.
Section 7. Transfer of Power to Consent to Adoption.
(A) In the case of an abandoned child the power to consent to
adoption shall vest in the state at the abandonment hearing.
(B) The power to consent to adoption in the case of a child who
is voluntarily relinquished or involuntarily placed in foster care pur-
suant to section 4(B) of this Act shall vest in the state after a full
court hearing, which must occur within six months after such place-
ment if the child is two years of age or less, or within one year if
the child is over two years of age unless a reasonable probability that
the child will be reunited with his natural parents within a reasonable
time is demonstrated to the court. The agency shall report at this
hearing on all efforts it has made to reunite the original family unit.
Commentary
Section 7 is designed to implement principle three. The selection
of the periods of six months and one year was based on current studies
of the damage caused by the separation of children from their parents.
These periods are considered most likely to strike an appropriate
balance between the interests of the child and his parents. It seems
unwise to draft a statute providing only a "reasonable" time limit,
in view of the clearly demonstrated reluctance of agencies and courts
to hold hearings to terminate parental rights. The term "transfer
of power to consent to adoption" is used in lieu of "termination of
parental rights" to acknowledge on the one hand that some important
parental rights such as custody have already been terminated, and
on the other hand that the emotional ties need not be severed. Even
if a child is adopted, for example, the biological parents may still be
able to visit and thus become almost an extended family for the child.
Section 8.
Once the power to consent to adoption has vested in the state, the
agency shall be responsible for seeking prompt adoptive placement
of the child and shall report to the court every three months on
its progress.
Commentary
This section is intended to ensure that children are not left in the
limbo of foster care after parental rights have been terminated.
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